The opinion of the court was delivered by: GREENE
Plaintiff, a graduate of the Potomac School of Law, filed this action to compel his admission to the District of Columbia Bar notwithstanding Rule 46 I(b)(3) of the Rules of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals which requires graduation from a law school accredited by the American Bar Association. In his motion for a preliminary injunction, filed July 19, 1978, he requests an order requiring defendants to permit him to sit for the District of Columbia bar examination to be administered on July 26 and 27, 1978. Defendants have filed a memorandum in opposition and the Court has heard argument.
Plaintiff's motion must be considered in light of the traditional test set forth by the U. S. Court of Appeals for this Circuit in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. Federal Power Commission, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921 (1958) and WMATA v. Holiday Tours, 182 U.S.App.D.C. 220, 559 F.2d 841 (1977). Under that standard plaintiff has failed to demonstrate his entitlement to the extraordinary mandatory relief he seeks.
Insofar as the claim of injury to plaintiff is concerned, he has completed a three-year course of study at the Potomac School of Law, apparently with distinction. If he is never permitted to take the bar examination, he will lose his entire investment of time, money, and energy. Further, if he cannot sit for the current examination, he will at least lose some time, and it would be difficult as a practical matter (and possibly as a legal matter) to make him whole for the delay between now and such time as he might be allowed to sit for the bar should he ultimately prevail in this action on the merits.
Plaintiff also points to his relatively mature age and the fact that he is currently unemployed (although it appears that, as a retired naval officer, he is drawing a pension). Thus, there is little doubt that, absent an order from this Court, plaintiff will suffer some injury.
On the other hand, this litigation, including probable appellate review, may not reach its ultimate resolution for several months or even years, and it is unlikely that plaintiff will be finally admitted to the Bar, if at all, until then. Thus, the actual redress sought by the plaintiff, that is, the ability to practice law in this jurisdiction, could not, in any event, be provided at this juncture, and an order which would have the effect of permitting him to sit for the July 1978 bar examination might not, realistically, shorten the time period to his admission to the District of Columbia Bar.
Beyond that, it appears that if plaintiff now finds himself in a situation where he requires emergency relief, he must share at least some of the responsibility. He did not file this action in November 1977 when he first learned that a waiver of the requirements of Rule 46 would not be granted to graduates of the Potomac School of Law, nor did he file immediately after June 12, 1978, when the D.C. Court of Appeals finally refused that waiver to him. Indeed, plaintiff does not appear ever to have formally applied to take the bar examination, although that failure may be regarded as excused in view of the fact that it would have constituted a futile act. Finally, it is at least noteworthy that plaintiff, who is not a District of Columbia resident, might well be eligible, notwithstanding his status as a graduate of a non-accredited law school, to take the bar examination in his own state or another state in the metropolitan area. In short, plaintiff has demonstrated an injury which is irreparable if he is never allowed to take any bar examination, and which is of a lesser degree of seriousness if he is not permitted to sit for the July 1978 bar examination of the District of Columbia.
It seems appropriate to treat the factors of injury to defendants and the public interest together, since in this instance they are inextricably linked. The D.C. Court of Appeals is the highest court of the District of Columbia, and its status is that of a state supreme court. Any order directed to it or its judges would be a serious intrusion into areas which not only are intrinsically matters of local judicial jurisdiction and concern, but which were deliberately transferred from this Court to defendants' control by the Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 473 (1970). As the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1969), the general rule of noninterference by federal courts into matters of state bar admissions "serves substantial policy interests arising from the historic relationship between state judicial systems and the members of their respective bars, and between the state and federal judicial systems."
While principles of federal-state relationships, abstention, and comity must be given full deference, it does not follow that if there is federal jurisdiction, and if defendants and others under their control are violating plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights, the Court should not or would not act. However, it is clear that in view of the impact such action would have both upon the defendants and the public interest, it should be taken only in compelling circumstances.
Thus, the critical issue on this motion is whether there is such a substantial likelihood of plaintiff's success on the merits that compelling circumstances are in fact present. These "merits" will be discussed under three headings: (1) jurisdiction, (2) constitutional claims, and (3) claims under the antitrust laws.
The law with respect to federal court jurisdiction in this field is not wholly settled. Defendants rely upon a number of decisions in this Circuit, but these cases are not dispositive. Lent v. Committee on Admissions and Grievances (Civil No. 386-72, Gesell, J., 1972) was decided primarily on mootness grounds. Metropolitan Committee for the Investigation of the D.C. Bar v. Committee on Admissions (Civil No. 74-177, Green, J., 1974) was concluded by an order which is silent on the basis for the jurisdictional defect found by the Court. And Dormu v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Civil No. 75-2037, Pratt, J., 1977), in which the Court found lack of jurisdiction, was affirmed by an opinion in which the U. S. Court of Appeals in somewhat equivocal language stated that "it is highly doubtful that we have jurisdiction to grant such relief under any circumstances; in any event, we are not about to do so" (D.C.Civ. No. 77-1674 (1978)). While there are scattered decisions elsewhere finding federal court jurisdiction over state bar admission matters (see, E. g., Potts v. Honorable Justices, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D.Hawaii 1971)), and while in a number of cases, including those relied on by defendants, federal courts have reached the merits of attacks upon state bar admission procedures and standards which presumably they felt they had the jurisdiction to do the most solid precedents suggest an absence of jurisdiction. See Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976); Grossgold v. Supreme Court of Illinois, 557 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1977); MacKay v. Nesbett, supra; Jones v. Hulse, 391 F.2d 198 (8th Cir. 1968).
It is not possible fully to harmonize these varying precedents except possibly upon the basis of the distinction made by the court in Doe v. Pringle, supra, Which suggested that there would be no federal court review of orders denying particular applications for admission but that general rules and regulations governing admission in relation to federal constitutional claims are not immune from such consideration. That distinction may not always be easily applied, as this case bears out. However, the current state of the law is such that, while this Court is not prepared at this stage to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, it is apparent that plaintiff will face a formidable hurdle in his efforts to succeed on the jurisdictional question.
Assuming that the Court should ultimately find subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff would be faced with the further problem that on the substantive merits his expectation of success is relatively slim. A number of courts have held that the requirement of graduation from an accredited law school is a reasonable one which does not offend due process. See Potter v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 403 F. Supp. 1036 (D.N.J.1975), Affirmed, 546 F.2d 418 (3rd Cir. 1976); Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1966); Murphy v. State Board of Bar Examiners for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 429 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.Pa.1977). Plaintiff's reliance to the contrary on Berger v. Board of Psychologist Examiners, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 396, 521 F.2d 1056 (1975) is misplaced. The Court there held only that the requirement of a graduate degree as a prerequisite to taking a licensing examination is invalid as applied to current practitioners with meaningful grandfather rights. As to future applicants, however, it found it to be reasonable to require graduate degrees of prospective licensees, "just as it is required of doctors and lawyers." 172 U.S.App.D.C. at 403, 521 F.2d at 1063.
Quite apart from decisional law, it appears to the Court that a requirement of graduation from an accredited law school constitutes a reasonable measure to maintain high standards in the legal profession, and that, at a minimum, this is a decision for the state accrediting agencies and highest courts of the states to make.