It is undisputed that defendant Iran is a foreign state under section 1603(a), that defendant Department of Civil Aviation is an agency of a foreign state within the meaning of section 1603(b), and that defendants were served in accordance with section 1608. The dispositive question posed is whether defendants' negligent operation and maintenance of Mehrabad Airport "cause(d) a direct effect in the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), clause 3.
The House Report which accompanied the Immunities Act describes section 1330(b) as creating a federal long-arm statute over foreign states. The drafters explain that the Act's long-arm statute is patterned after the District of Columbia's long-arm statute. The legislative history also indicates that the requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice as required by cases such as International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977), are embodied in the Act. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 6604. See Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y.1978).
The Court finds that causing injury to American citizens abroad is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the District of Columbia long-arm statute. See Leaks v. Ex-Lax, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C.1976) (suffering pain in the District caused by an injury received outside the District is insufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction under the long-arm statute); Norair Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Noland, 365 F. Supp. 740 (D.D.C.1973) (financial expenditures and indebtedness incurred in the District due to an injury outside the District does not establish a sufficient nexus for jurisdiction under the long-arm statute).
Moreover, mere ownership of an airport abroad does not establish sufficient contacts with the District to satisfy International Shoe. There has been no attempt by Iran or its Department of Civil Aviation to avail themselves of the protections or privileges afforded by the United States. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1953); Carey v. National Oil Corp., supra.
The relatively simple statement of plaintiffs' position points up the correctness of this result. They contend that "defendants' acts caused the deaths and injuries to Americans Which caused direct effects in the United States." Plaintiffs' Statement of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 3 (November 4, 1977) (emphasis added). Their own language attenuates the connection between the act and the effect. The common sense interpretation of a "direct effect" is one which has no intervening element, but, rather, flows in a straight line without deviation or interruption. The unintended candor of plaintiffs' words demonstrates the indirect nature of the injuries which, though endured here, were caused in Tehran.
In conclusion, as a matter of law, no direct effects were caused in the United States by the defendants' actions at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran, Iran, and therefore one of the two tests of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), clause 3, has not been satisfied. Inasmuch as section 1605(a)(2), clause 3, is unavailable to remove defendants' immunity under section 1604, and plaintiffs are unable to assert jurisdiction under any of the alternative exceptions to sovereign immunity, this Court lacks subject matter and personal jurisdiction over these defendants by the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1330. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the action.
An order in accordance with the foregoing will be issued of even date herewith.
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