report provided ample basis for the rejections which were thus clearly reasonable under all the circumstances.
In both cases the procedures specified in the applicable regulations were adhered to strictly. Plaintiff's claim that it had a constitutional right to notice and an informal hearing before rejection of its low bids is not supported by the regulations, See DAR § 1-905.3(ii); Opinion B-151269, 43 Comp. Gen. 140, 141 (1963); furthermore, it is without merit, See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972), particularly in view of the fact, noted Infra, that the military has now initiated proceedings under its suspension regulations, which proceedings will provide plaintiff with an "opportunity to clear (its) name," See DAR § 1-605.2(a)(1) & (2); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 156-58, 171 n.6, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1974).
Plaintiff also contends that, without having been afforded a hearing, it has been effectively barred from bidding on all upcoming government contracts. Plaintiff bases this contention on the considerable likelihood that the audit report will come to the attention of every future contracting officer and will induce every such contracting officer to act in the same manner as did contracting officers Trevino and Barrett and find a lack of responsibility. Plaintiff underscores the unfairness inherent in this situation and the necessity for prompt relief by noting that an important contract involving the supply of milk and related products to the Air Force at Korea will soon be coming up for bid. When this issue of plaintiff's De facto debarment or suspension was initially presented, the Court denied plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order, but left open the possibility of more permanent relief at some later juncture. On the day that the trial of this case commenced, however, the Air Force issued an Order of Suspension pursuant to DAR §§ 1-605 Et seq. In view of this development, plaintiff's future eligibility to bid must be left to plaintiff's pursuit of the remedies now available under the aforementioned regulations. Any constitutional attack on those provisions is most certainly premature. An administrative hearing on the suspension has neither yet been set nor denied.
For these reasons no basis for any injunctive relief exists. The Court in its discretion is unwilling to entertain plaintiff's alternative prayer for declaratory relief absent proof of a clear violation of duty or palpable illegality. See generally M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 232-235, 455 F.2d 1289, 1300-03 (1971). Moreover, as noted above, proceedings have already been initiated before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals that raise several of the issues aired in this case as to plaintiff's performance under the current Okinawa contract. Nothing in these findings of fact and conclusions of law is intended in any way to affect plaintiff's rights and remedies in that or any other administrative proceeding or before the Court of Claims (should that court's jurisdiction be eventually invoked).
For the reasons set forth above, the complaint is dismissed and the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment for defendants.
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