5, 14, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In addition, the adequacy of an EIS must be judged on the basis of a "reasonableness" standard.
The EIS in this case satisfied these standards. Plaintiffs do not suggest that the analysis of the impact of its nuclear power plant proposal is inadequate. Rather, they argue that the detailed analysis on the water, soil, plant and animal resources in the area of the plant must be redone to accommodate plaintiffs' interest in sharing the property with DOI. NEPA simply does not require this. See Vermont Yankee, supra, 435 U.S. at 551, 98 S. Ct. at 1215. Thus the Court concludes that the decisionmaker had sufficient information from which to make a reasoned choice as to whether 120 acres of the NALF should be used for a nuclear power plant.
Similarly, plaintiffs' claims regarding the Administrative Procedure Act are equally unfounded. As noted in the Court's opinion denying the preliminary injunction, the scope of judicial review is limited to determining whether the agency has presented a rational basis for its decision and whether it has "demonstrably . . . given reasoned consideration to the issues, and has reached a result which rationally flows from its conclusions." Sierra Club v. EPA, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 345, 540 F.2d 1114, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The record reflects that at the time the Acting Administrator rendered his decision he had the views of all interested parties before him, including plaintiffs'. His decision paper demonstrates the consideration given to plaintiffs' proposal and points out the ecological factors militating against any major construction project at the site. The paper also analyzes the proposals submitted by DOI, EPA and the town of Charlestown and the basis for transferring the property to each of them. Thus, the record establishes that the Administrator evaluated the alternatives and presented a rational basis for his decision in accordance with the requirements of the APA.
Plaintiffs' claims under the FPAS must also fail. In this regard, plaintiffs complain of the manner of disposal of the property under the Act and GSA regulations.
It is clear that the FPAS establishes a federal preference for disposal of the property. To this end GSA and all other federal agencies are required to make excess property available to other federal agencies to meet their needs before they give consideration to disposing of the property to non-federal bodies.
In this case DOI and EPA applied for transfer of the NALF and explained the uses to which they would put the property in order to fulfill their statutory responsibilities. The record reflects that the Acting Administrator evaluated and accepted the representations of the federal agencies as to their needs. Indeed plaintiffs have not suggested that the needs of DOI and EPA are not legitimate.
Therefore, the only issue is whether the decision to dispose of the remaining or surplus
property to the town of Charlestown was an appropriate exercise of the discretion vested in the Administrator under the Act and applicable GSA regulations.
In 1970, Congress enacted the provision under which the Town is to receive the 182 acre parcel, 40 U.S.C. § 484(k)(2). In so doing, Congress emphasized both the value of making surplus property available to local governments for park and recreation purposes and the fact that the GSA had the discretion to decide whether the land should be used for those purposes. H.R.Rep.No.91-1225, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 4300, 4304.
The final question here, then is how much weight GSA must give to the Town of Charlestown's request for the 182 and 55 acre parcels. The answer, as stated in the legislative history quoted above, is that the decision is within the sound discretion of the Administrator, but that Congress has indicated, through the passage of 40 U.S.C. 484(k)(2) and through the structure of § 484 itself that the Administrator is to give particular attention to the conservation and recreation values and to the needs and requests of state and local governments.
The Acting Administrator correctly ruled that the 367 acres will be transferred to EPA and Interior for wildlife conservation purposes. Having done so, he added further weight to the Town's claim, since the Town's proposed uses are particularly consistent with the activities to be carried out by EPA and Interior.
Thus, plaintiffs' claim that the Administrator violated the FPAS and GSA regulations pertaining to the optimum use of the property is refuted by the decision itself. In accordance with the terms of the FPAS, Acting Administrator Goulding gave the needs of the federal agencies priority. In the exercise of the discretion vested in him by the Act he considered and decided that the Town of Charlestown's proposal further effectuated the federal uses.
Finally, plaintiffs seek to probe the mind of the decisionmaker to determine if he was biased. This claim is based on Goulding's personal familiarity with his home state of Rhode Island and his having campaigned for Senate from Rhode Island three years earlier on an anti-nuclear power platform.
The standard that applies in determining whether a decisionmaker is biased is set out in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), in which the Court upheld the validity of an environmental impact statement despite the fact that officials responsible for preparing the statement had stated that the dam in question would be built. Rejecting the bias claim, the Court held that
The test of compliance with § 102, then, is one of good faith objectivity rather than subjective impartiality.
Id.. at 296. Similarly, in Carolina Environmental Study Group v. U. S., 166 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975), this Circuit held:
Agencies are required to consider in good faith, and to objectively evaluate, arguments presented to them; agency officials, however, need not be subjectively impartial.