against him or that he was their reprisal target. Nor is there any showing that the Union and the IEB were in any way dominated by and subject to the will of President Miller.
Lamb's argument that Miller was motivated in suspending and removing him as a member of the IEB and enforcing the UMWA expenses accounting rules by a desire to get rid of and exile him as a principal political opponent is overdrawn. Essentially, he refers to policy disagreements with Miller within the Union. However, his activities and role in that regard were not unique or unusual. They are a part of the day-to-day operation of a union.
There is no contention by the plaintiff nor does the record show that the defendants failed to comply with the UMWA Constitution in suspending and removing the plaintiff as the District 6 representative. Article 5, Section 3, of the Constitution provides that the President "may suspend or remove any International Officer (IEB Members are International Officers) or appointed employee for insubordination or just and sufficient cause." Section 5 of Article 5 provides, "All appointments, suspensions and removals from office done by the President shall be subject to the approval of the International Executive Board." Section 7 of the same Article authorizes the President to interpret the meaning of the Constitution subject, however, to repeal by the IEB. Between sessions of the Board the President has full power to direct the workings of the Union but he is required to report his acts to the Board for approval.
The Court has jurisdiction over this action under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411 and 412. Cooke v. Orange Belt District Council of Painters, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960, 94 S. Ct. 1490, 39 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1974).
The plaintiff Lamb was requested to but he failed to comply fully with the Union's directives for an accounting until October 1979. He acted deliberately and in doing so he was insubordinate.
The requirements and demands placed upon Lamb by the defendants were necessary, reasonable and proper. They were also authorized and mandated by the Act. All labor unions, including the UMWA, are required under § 431(b)(3) to file annual financial reports with the Secretary of Labor disclosing "allowances, and other direct or indirect disbursements (including reimbursed expenses) to each officer." Section 436 provides that a union shall "maintain records on the matters required to be reported (under § 431(b)(3)) which will provide in sufficient detail the necessary basic information and data from which the documents . . . may be verified, explained . . . and checked for accuracy and completeness . . . ." Moreover, an outstanding injunction entered by Chief Judge William B. Bryant of this Court directs the UMWA in particular to maintain such detailed financial records. Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of America, 344 F. Supp. 17, 38 (D.D.C.1972).
The actions of the IEB have not been challenged on due process grounds and the Court upon review of the record concludes that that is not an issue here. Section 411(a)(5)(C) of the Act mandates "a reasonable time to prepare . . . defense" and "a full and fair hearing" for union members. As interpreted "this guarantee requires the charging party to provide some evidence at the disciplinary hearing to support the charges made." (Emphasis added.) Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 at 246, 91 S. Ct. 609 at 617, 28 L. Ed. 2d 10 (1971). Lamb had ample opportunity to prepare his defense. He does not claim otherwise. There was persuasive and sufficient evidence before the various IEB meetings of Lamb's insubordination and continued refusal to comply with the expense accounting rules. In reviewing union disciplinary proceedings our Circuit has noted: "There is no requirement of "substantial evidence'. The limited judicial role staked out by the Supreme Court for these cases leads us to affirm the conclusion of the district court that the union met its burden of producing some evidence to support the charges . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Ritz v. O'Donnell, 185 U.S. App. D.C. 66, 566 F.2d 731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
On basis of the material undisputed facts, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. In Ritz, our Circuit Court upheld the trial court's entry of summary judgment and refused to enjoin enforcement of disciplinary sanctions because a union member disobeyed and failed to comply with an executive board order to account for certain funds and file reports as required by law. Ritz claimed that retaliatory disciplinary action was instituted because of his opposition to the union's leadership as does Lamb in this proceeding. Ritz also claimed that he was denied a full and fair hearing. Lamb does not make that assertion. The basic union charge against Ritz was that he failed to file required financial information. As to that Judge Harold Leventhal remarked at page 737 that:
Moreover, the courts are subject to restraint, to the clear import of Boilermakers that in this field of law the courts have a distinctly narrower supervisory role over union disciplinary proceedings than over agency proceedings, and a fortiori than criminal proceedings. We must scrutinize the procedures, but intervene only if there has been a breach of fundamental fairness.
The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that such breach occurred here.
Lamb did eventually comply with the Union's requirements. However, the Court cannot conclude from the record that the action of either President Miller or the IEB was based on a lack of evidence or that under the circumstances the defendants' actions were unreasonable or unwarranted. Lamb had more than ample opportunity to comply.
While the defendants challenge the legal basis of the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff Anthony Bumbico, absent any factual finding in support of Floyd Lamb's allegations, the claim of his co-plaintiff must fail.
The defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
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