Plaintiff's other claims can be disposed of more briefly. Plaintiff contends that application of the 1978 amendments would deprive it of property without due process of law. The due process argument has two facets: plaintiff contends that the provisions retroactively destroy vested property rights, and that the failure of the statute to provide adequate notice violates procedural due process. As to the former claim, the burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate that the statute operates irrationally. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464-65, 99 L. Ed. 563 (1955). Although statutes that operate retroactively must be examined with particular care to determine whether their retroactive features are themselves irrational or arbitrary,
the retroactive aspects of the 1978 amendments do not pose anything resembling a close question. The legislative history of the statute demonstrates that Congress thoughtfully and thoroughly considered the deficiencies in the pesticide registration program and legislated a careful scheme to provide the optimal accommodation, in its view, between competition and innovation in the industry. See, e. g., Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 35-38. The retroactive provisions are a rational means for effectuating Congress's intent that the registration program be made more efficient and speedy, that increased competition be provided in the industry, and that potential hazards be disclosed to the public. Having established the rational relationship between Congress's goals and the means it chose to implement them, the Court's investigation is at an end.
Plaintiff's procedural due process claim fails as well. Once the Court has concluded that the 1978 statute does not effect a taking of private property without just compensation or an interference with vested property rights, plaintiff's claim that the government must accord it notice and a hearing before each disclosure or use of its data obviously cannot be sustained.
Plaintiff has failed to establish any of the elements comprising the standard for preliminary relief in this Circuit. The Court has concluded that the challenged statute does not effect a taking. Even if it were incorrect on this issue, plaintiff could prevail only if it were able to demonstrate that the taking was for a private purpose a claim that is patently frivolous or that the Tucker Act remedy had been withdrawn a position that is chancy. For these reasons, the Court concludes that plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits are remote. Additionally, since damages would appear to be a satisfactory remedy, plaintiff has not begun to show irreparable injury; the balance of harms do not clearly go plaintiff's way;
and the public interest favors implementation of the congressional scheme embodied in the 1978 amendments.
The government has moved for summary judgment. The material facts that, according to plaintiff, remain in dispute are either legal conclusions or are immaterial to the Court's determinations. The Court therefore concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.