power alleged would, all things being equal, give plaintiffs standing to bring this action. Kennedy v. Sampson, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 192, 511 F.2d 430 (1974). The prospect of a significant change in the division of House committee assignments effected by the House majority is sufficiently remote that the Court cannot assume that a legislative remedy is a viable alternative to judicial relief, justifying the Court to stand aside.
The Court concludes, however, that the plaintiffs have not overcome the defendants' challenge to this Court's jurisdiction by virtue of both the Speech and Debate Clause and the corollary Separation of Powers doctrine. The Court is persuaded that actions taken by House Members belonging to one party pursuant to decisions made by them in a caucus of that party are actions performed within the "legitimate legislative sphere." See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 44 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13, 93 S. Ct. 2018, 2024-25, 36 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 92 S. Ct. 2531, 33 L. Ed. 2d 507 (1972); see also Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 S. Ct. 1425, 18 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1967). It is apparent from the face of the complaint and reasonable inferences therefrom that defendant Members determined in caucus somewhat unofficially how they, as a group of party members, would vote on the floor of the House with respect to the composition of the Committees of the House. This caucus action was in preparation for and in discharge of the official duty of the Members qua Members to elect standing committees. The rules of the House limit the committees so elected to nominees of the party caucus. H.R. Rule X, Cl. 6(a)(1), Rules of the House of Representatives, reprinted in Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 95-403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 384-85 (1979). Thus, the actions contested by the plaintiffs were in performance of legislative duties defined by the House's own rules, which rules specifically contemplate a nominating role for the caucus. Accordingly, the actions complained of, even though they might affect plaintiffs' constitutional rights as voters and Members, are beyond the reach of this Court by virtue of the Speech and Debate Clause. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 508, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 1957, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 26 L. Ed. 377 (1881).
The actions of a caucus in the House are governed by the House Rules. Art. I, § 5, cl. 2 of the Constitution confers upon the House the power "to determine the Rules of its Proceedings." This textual commitment of the issue to the House would oust the Court's jurisdiction, even if such jurisdiction were not more explicitly foreclosed by the Speech and Debate Clause. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962); see also Winpisinger v. Watson, 202 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 628 F.2d 133 (1980).
The obvious defects in the Court's jurisdiction make redundant exploration of other issues raised. Accordingly, an accompanying order will dismiss the complaint on jurisdictional grounds.
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