other work for the attorneys involved, as well as throughout this litigation. Despite the fact that the Kohn, Milstein & Cohen firm put in 90% of their hours in 1980-81, the Court will not award any additional points, as it would result in an inequitable total fee award. The remaining five (5) points will be awarded to the Freeman firm in order to make their award more equitable.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court will award the following points:
This amounts to an additional fee award of:
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing and the entire record herein, the Court will award the following total fees:
In determining the fees applicable to each firm, the Court is not insensitive to the fact that certain firms were cut back more than others. However, in determining the adequacy of the fees awarded, the Court first examined the percentage of the original fee request awarded. That is, the Court awarded fees amounting to 72% of the total amount of fees requested. Of the eleven fee petitions received, five firms received more than the 72%, one firm received exactly 72% and one firm received only 3% less than the 72% average. However, for purposes of this award, a three percent plus or minus difference falls within the relevant range of allowable fees. It is no coincidence that the remaining firms have four of the top five average hourly rates. Indeed, the adequacy of this award is even more obvious when based on the following.
The first firm, Freeman, Roth, Freeman & Salzman claimed the highest average hourly rate of $ 126.00. Had the Freeman firm used a more reasonable rate, such as the $ 83.00 rate claimed by the Dickstein firm,
their total fee request would have been $ 242,339.25, which would have led to an award of 98% of their request. Even if the Freeman firm had used the second highest average hourly rate of $ 117.00, their total fee request would have amounted to $ 341,610.75 or 69% of their request. This would have fallen within the Court's plus or minus 3% figure.
The second highest average hourly rate is claimed by Lane, Aitken, Dunner & Ziems of $ 117.00. For the reasons as set forth above, the Court did not add any incentive award to their request. However, the Court notes that had the Lane firm used the $ 83.00 average of the Dickstein firm, their total fee request would have amounted to $ 140,567.97 or 66% of their request. While this is less than the plus or minus 3% range as imposed by the Court, it shows that the award is more than reasonable.
The third highest average hourly rate of $ 110.00 belongs to Chestnut & Brooks. Once again, the Court notes that had the Chestnut firm used the $ 83.00 rate, their total fee request would have amounted to $ 101,392.80 or 76% of their total request.
The last "firm" is the State of California. The Court again denied an incentive award as explained above. Nevertheless, if the State of California had used the $ 83.00 rate, their total fee request would have amounted to $ 185,090.00 or 71%, which is only 1% less than the average reduction.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the entire record herein, the Court is satisfied that the fees awarded are fair and reasonable.
The final element for the Court to consider is the issue of reasonable expenses. In reviewing the fee petitions, the Court is satisfied that the requests for costs are totally reasonable. Accordingly, the Court will reimburse the firms for costs as follows:
Thus the total amount of fees and expenses to be awarded by the Court to each firm is as follows:
The total of $ 3,285,000.00 in fees and expenses shall be allocated among the residual classes
and the litigating CCS plaintiffs and classes
(a) Sixty-five (65) percent of the residual class share
of the CCS settlement fund will be used for the payment of common fees and expenses.
(b) The remaining fees and expenses will be charged pro rata among the litigating CCS plaintiffs and classes.
An Order in accordance with the foregoing shall be issued at the time the settlement becomes final and the settlement fund exceeds $ 7.3 million. Accordingly, during the interim, liaison counsel is to advise the Court, within five days from the date hereof, when the two above-mentioned events are to occur.