enforcement of any outstanding notice or order issued by an agency under section 1818. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i). Aside from these carefully delineated circumstances where federal district courts are granted jurisdiction over cease and desist controversies, Congress has categorically determined that "no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or order." Id.
It is apparent to the Court that this scheme of judicial review established by Congress and codified in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h), (i) deprives it of subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action. It is by now well-established that all federal courts, with the exception of the Supreme Court, derive their jurisdiction from the authority conferred upon the Congress by Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187, 63 S. Ct. 1019, 1022, 87 L. Ed. 1339 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49, 12 L. Ed. 1147 (1850). When Congress decides to withdraw jurisdiction from the lower federal courts, the judicial inquiry is confined to ascertaining whether the action before the Court falls within the class of controversies that Congress intended to remove from judicial purview. Here Congress has plainly and unequivocally divested the district courts of jurisdiction over any dispute arising from agency action initiated under 12 U.S.C. § 1818, subject only to certain exceptions delineated by the statute. Plaintiffs have not, and indeed cannot, argue that any of those exceptions are applicable to the present controversy; as such, both common sense and the language of the statute preclude this Court from exercising jurisdiction over this cause of action.
It is also well-settled that "(w)here Congress has provided an adequate procedure to obtain judicial review of agency action, that statutory provision is the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review in those situations to which it applies." Memphis Trust Company v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 584 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1978). See also Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Company, 379 U.S. 411, 419-23, 85 S. Ct. 551, 556-59, 13 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1965); Nader v. Volpe, 151 U.S. App. D.C. 90, 95-96, 466 F.2d 261, 266-67 (1972). General nonstatutory review of administrative action is available only in the absence of a specific statute authorizing review in a particular court. Memphis Trust Company v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, supra; Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. 414, 418 (M.D.Tenn.1979). See generally Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 980 (1975). In fact, even where Congress has not expressly conferred exclusive jurisdiction, "a special review statute vesting jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off other courts' original jurisdiction in all cases covered by the special statute." Investment Company Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 179 U.S. App. D.C. 311, 320, 551 F.2d 1270, 1279 (1977). See also Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corporation, 327 U.S. 540, 543-45, 66 S. Ct. 712, 713-14, 90 L. Ed. 839 (1946); UMC Industries, Inc. v. Seaborg, 439 F.2d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 1971). Based on this reasoning, the Court would have no difficulty in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action even if the specific exclusionary provision of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) was not part of the statute, for the establishment of a direct review procedure in the Circuit Courts of Appeal under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2) is by itself sufficient to preclude district court jurisdiction over actions of this type which effectively seek the review, modification, suspension, termination, or setting aside of final orders entered by the Comptroller. The express statement of exclusivity contained in subsection (i) merely articulates what is already implicit in the language of subsection (h)(2).
For these reasons, none of the general jurisdictional statutes cited in the complaint are operative here, because those provisions confer jurisdiction upon this Court only to the extent that Congress has previously carved out a role for the district courts in the more focused and controlling statutory scheme set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1818.
In opposing the defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiffs rely heavily upon the rule in Investment Company Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, supra, 179 U.S. App. D.C. at 321, 551 F.2d 1270, that "(if) any doubt as to the proper forum exists, careful counsel should file suit in both the court of appeals and the district court ...." The short answer to plaintiffs' effort to ascribe controlling weight to that admonition is that it is wholly inapplicable to the facts of this case. By its own terms the cautionary rule of Investment Company Institute authorizes dual filing only when doubt exists as to the appropriate forum in which to obtain judicial review of agency action. Whatever jurisdictional uncertainty may have existed in Investment Company Institute, which arose under the exclusivity provisions of section 9 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1848, is not present in this action, where FISA provides explicit guidance on the proper jurisdictional limits of the district courts in reviewing agency enforcement actions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i). Section 1818 provides a comprehensive framework for regulatory enforcement and judicial review at various stages of the enforcement process; "and section 1818(i) in particular evinces a clear intention that this regulatory process is not to be disturbed by untimely judicial intervention" in the absence of a clear administrative departure from statutory authority. Groos National Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, supra, at 895. Where, as here, Congress has established a detailed statutory procedure for obtaining judicial review of administrative action in the Courts of Appeal, litigants may not avail themselves of the externalized medium of collateral attack in the district courts to thwart the legislative design. See, e.g., Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Company, supra, 379 U.S. at 421-22, 85 S. Ct. at 557-58; Marshall & Ilsley Corporation v. Heimann, 652 F.2d 685, 699-702 (7th Cir. 1981); American Local Company v. United States Department of Labor, 639 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiffs also cite Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567-68, 95 S. Ct. 1851, 1857-58, 44 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1975) and Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1510, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967) to support the proposition that "judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is a persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress." Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 140, 87 S. Ct. at 1510. However, the presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is in no sense threatened by a congressional determination to endow the Circuit Courts of Appeal with exclusive review authority over a limited range of agency decisions. The presumption of reviewability spelled out by the Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories and Dunlop was not intended to give litigants a vested right to obtain review of agency action at any level of the federal judiciary; one forum is decidedly sufficient.
Finally, the Court cannot accept plaintiffs' contention that the allegations of procedural irregularity in the complaint reveal "a clear departure from statutory authority", Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1973) and justify an assumption of jurisdiction in contravention of the language of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i). It is of course true that "even where the intent of Congress was to preclude judicial review, a limited jurisdiction exists in the court to review actions which on their face are plainly in excess of statutory authority ...." Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 408, 97 S. Ct. 2428, 2430, 53 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1977), quoting Briscoe v. Levi, 175 U.S. App. D.C. 297, 303, 535 F.2d 1259, 1265 (1976). Nevertheless, the Court does not believe that plaintiffs' allegations of procedural improprieties amount to such a palpable violation of substantial rights irremediable by the prescribed method of appellate review that the Court must make nonstatutory remedies available. Plaintiffs will presumably have ample opportunity to develop their allegations before the Court of Appeals.
To summarize, the Court believes that exercising jurisdiction over this controversy would be wholly unwarranted in light of the carefully calibrated scheme of exclusive appellate review established by 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2), (i). Regardless of how plaintiffs choose to style their complaint, they are essentially asking the Court to accomplish exactly what the statute prohibits by reviewing, setting aside, modifying, and/or enjoining the enforcement of the Comptroller's order. Whether the Comptroller's findings are supported by substantial evidence, and whether the procedures utilized by the Comptroller comport with constitutional and statutory requirements, are questions to be decided, if at all, by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as it exercises its power of review under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2). The defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted, and the plaintiffs' motion for a stay of proceedings will be denied. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued on this date.