The opinion of the court was delivered by: GREEN
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was decided on its merits by this Court in a Memorandum Opinion and Order filed on September 23, 1981, (reported at 522 F. Supp. 1102 (1981) (and hereinafter referred to as Order of September 23, 1981). Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion captioned "Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration," by which plaintiffs request this court to "clarify or restate" certain portions of its decision. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration at 1.
In particular, plaintiffs take issue with the determination that, "The Hearing Officer is not, however, empowered to do that which both parties suggest: address the issue of the defendants' financial responsibility for the parents' proposed school" ( Order of September 23, 1981, at 12, 522 F. Supp. at 1109) and that, "To say that the Hearing Officer may "determine financial responsibility' is a misstatement." Id. at 14, 522 F. Supp. at 1110. Plaintiffs contend that these two statements "directly conflict with federal law and the expressed intent of Congress." Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration at 1.
Plaintiffs do not intimate the particular Federal Rule of Civil Procedure upon which they base their motion. It is unclear whether plaintiffs request alteration or amendment of the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or amendment of the conclusions of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b).
Since the time limitations for the filing of either type of motion are the same, plaintiffs did file in a timely manner. It need not be decided which form of relief plaintiffs seek, Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 261-62 n.5, 98 S. Ct. 556, 559, 54 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1977); 6A Moore's Federal Practice P 59.04(6) (2d ed. 1973); 9 Moore's Federal Practice P 204.12(1), at 4-67 (2d ed. 1980), since this Court declines to modify in any way its Order of September 23, 1981. In the interests of justice, however, the court will herein reiterate-and hopefully thereby clarify-its decision and address specifically the arguments raised in the plaintiffs' motion.
Plaintiffs apparently view the placement process as follows. The school district evaluates the child and proposes a placement. If the parents or guardians disagree with the school district's proposal for any reason, they are entitled to a hearing before an impartial Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer, plaintiffs contend, should hear all of the evidence that both the school district and the parents wish to present about either the proposed school or any other alternatives, and then decide which of the various placements discussed is appropriate, if any. If the school which the parents propose happens to be a private facility, the Hearing Officer then considers who should bear the financial responsibility. It is not clear whether plaintiffs wish such financial considerations to be part of the evaluation of the appropriateness of the parents' proposed school, or some sort of a separate determination.
This is not new law created by this Court, but rather is the placement process mandated by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 and Supp. III 1979), the regulations promulgated thereunder, 34 C.F.R. § 300.1 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979), its regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 104.1 et seq. (1980), and the decree in Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.1972), including "The Plan for the Education of Handicapped and Exceptional Children in the District of Columbia" (the "Plan") approved in 1977.
Plaintiffs wish to replace the twenty-day reconsideration period provided by this scheme with an immediate decision by the Hearing Officer. Plaintiffs would have the Hearing Officer take matters into his own hands and, immediately upon finding the school district's initial proposal inappropriate, place the child in whichever program he considers appropriate. If that program happens to be a private facility, then presumably the Hearing Officer would thereby "determine financial responsibility." This may seem to be an expedient remedial step to arrive quickly at some type of placement decision, and the court can readily empathize with frustration exacerbated by bureaucratic delay. Nonetheless, it would be an improper erosion of the school district's responsibility under the applicable statutes and the Mills decree, as well as an unnecessary temptation for the District of Columbia Public Schools to abdicate that responsibility knowing that, if a hearing is held, the Hearing Officer will do the job for them.
If the Hearing Officer finds a particular placement proposed by the schools to be inappropriate in light of information about some private facility, he may, and indeed, should, recommend that an appropriate placement would be that private facility. In this way he might strongly influence the school authorities to adopt that facility as their proposed placement during their 20-day reconsideration period. He cannot, however, make that placement himself, and therefore cannot "determine financial responsibility" outright. The only matter the Hearing Officer determines is the appropriateness of the educational placement offered by the school district. The question of who must bear the financial responsibility for a private school placement turns upon the appropriateness of that placement and the inappropriateness of the alternative public school placements proposed. The financial responsibility is always the school district's except when it offers an appropriate public, or even private, school education to the child which the parents choose not to accept, in which case it is the parents who must bear the cost of their chosen school. It is evident that a financial responsibility resolution turns solely on the appropriateness of the education offered by the school authorities; it is not some sort of separate determination.
This interpretation of the placement process is fully supported by the statutory scheme, the Mills plan, and the school board rules, as set out in the Order of September 23, 1981, which need not be repeated here. The documents to which plaintiffs point in their instant motion also support this interpretation, as will be discussed in detail below.
Plaintiffs' motion, however, reveals a possible cause of their confusion. They are concerned that, if the Hearing Officer is not given the power to determine financial responsibility and to mandate placement in a program other than the one proposed by the school district, the placement process for each child will become an endless cycle of proposals repeatedly rejected at hearings. The controversy presented to the Court in the instant matter was not in such a posture. The due process hearing at issue here was the first hearing in which a proposed placement for Carlotta Davis was challenged. Each of the statutes, regulations, Mills Plan provisions and school board rules cited in the Order of September 23, 1981 were construed in reference to a hearing in which the first proposal made by the school authorities was challenged. A ruling on the proper process to follow in different circumstances was explicitly reserved for another day. Order of September 23, 1981 at 14 n.15, 522 F. Supp. at 1110 n.15. A wholly different case would have been before the Court had the school district's first proposal already been found inappropriate and, after the twenty-day period, the school district either failed to make a second proposal or had made one which the Hearing Officer would find inappropriate.
It is in such a case where plaintiffs' fears concerning an endless placement dispute would have been realized. In such circumstances, there are many options open for a court to fashion relief, should it choose to do so. The limitations placed on the Hearing Officer by the Mills Plan and the school board rules (upon which the decision in the instant case was specifically based) are directed at only the first hearing.
There is an assumption, perhaps, that one twenty-day period for re-evaluation of its position is all the school authorities, acting in good faith, will ever need. If this assumption is not borne out by reality, any number of solutions are available. For example, the Mills Plan might be supplemented by another provision concerning second-round hearings which would grant hearing officers much broader powers after two determinations of inappropriateness of the school district's proposals. On the other hand, judicial resolution of such disputes on a case-by-case basis might prove more expedient. Or perhaps the procedure should be no different from the first hearing, and the school district should be given a chance to make a third proposal. In any event, the instant case did not purport to decide a controversy not before the Court, and plaintiffs should not err in believing that it did.
With this caveat in mind, examination of the arguments raised in plaintiffs' motion is called for.
Plaintiffs note that the Senate Report on the EHA states:
If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at that parent's own expense, to seek private schooling for the child because an appropriate program does not exist within the local educational agency responsible for the child's education and the local educational agency disagrees, that disagreement and the question of who remains financially responsible is a matter to which the due process procedures established under Section 614(5) applies.
S.Rep.No. 168, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 32 (1975), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 1425, 1456. It is clear that when a parent contends that the public school education offered his or her child is not appropriate, a due process hearing is in order. The sole issue at that hearing, though, will be whether the parent's contention that "an appropriate program does not exist" in the public schools, as stated in the report above, is correct and that therefore "he or she has been forced, at that parent's own expense, to seek private schooling for the child." In other words, the dispositive question is appropriateness ...