provides authority for the relief plaintiff seeks. The defendants also oppose class certification.
After consideration of the parties' legal memoranda, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court rejects the defendants' arguments and grants summary judgment and the class relief requested by the plaintiff. The reasons for the Court's conclusions are set out in the discussion which follows.
The undisputed material facts may be briefly stated. The drug abuse program involved in this proceeding was an enormous undertaking. It began in 1972 and, within 14 months, the military had subjected servicemembers to 4,400,000 urinalyses. If the test indicated illegal use of drugs, the abusing servicemember was issued a less than honorable administrative discharge.
Approximately 29,000 drug abusers, most of whom were identified through this program, were gleaned from the ranks of all branches of the military for drug abuse between 1970 and 1975 and were given less than honorable discharges.
Plaintiff Walters was one of those so discharged. He entered the Marine Corps in September 1973. Shortly thereafter he was ordered by Corps authorities to render a urine sample as part of the urinalysis testing program. When the test indicated that he had used phenobarbitol, the authorities questioned him and found that he had been using drugs during the year prior to enlistment. The Corps then initiated administrative discharge proceedings against him for fraudulent enlistment through concealment of preservice drug use. He was severed from the Corps with a general discharge on November 8, 1973.
Walters sought relief before the Naval Discharge Review Board
and requested an upgrade of his discharge in the Spring of 1980. However, shortly before a scheduled hearing, he withdrew his petition and subsequently brought this action on his own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated former members of the Marine Corps, the Navy and the Air Force.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Statute of Limitations
The defendants argue that this action is barred by the six-year limitation imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). That section provides that civil actions commenced against the United States shall be barred unless filed within six years after accrual of a right of action. Because this suit was not filed until April 22, 1981, and Walters was discharged in November 1973, the defendants claim that his suit is time-barred.
The Court concludes that the defendants are incorrect. Courts have frequently entertained challenges to court-martials long after the six-year period has expired. See, e.g., Homcy v. Resor, 147 U.S. App. D.C. 277, 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C.Cir.1971); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965); Calhoun v. Lehman, C.A. No. 78-0988 (D.D.C. January 27, 1982). There is no compelling reason why a different rule should apply for administrative discharges.
Even if the six-year limitations period applies in a case for an upgrade of a military discharge, this Court in Wood v. Secretary of Defense, 496 F. Supp. 192, 197-98 (D.D.C.1980), concluded that the cause of action does not accrue until the appropriate discharge review board denies the servicemember's request for an upgrade. Under the UCMJ, a discharged servicemember has 15 years after the discharge to petition the military board for review. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a). Since the time for Walters to bring such a petition has not expired, his cause of action has not yet accrued and the statutory time under section 2401(a) has not yet begun to run. Therefore, this action is not time-barred.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under 10 U.S.C. § 1553(b), the Naval Discharge Review Board could have upgraded Walters' discharge had he not withdrawn his petition for review filed with that Board. Because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies the defendants argue that this Court should not exercise jurisdiction. In urging that position they rely on a long line of case authority which holds that, for reasons of judicial economy and primary jurisdiction, all available avenues of military administrative appeal must be exhausted before judicial review is available. Knehans v. Alexander, 184 U.S. App. D.C. 420, 566 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995, 98 S. Ct. 1646, 56 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1978); Hayes v. Secretary of Defense, 169 U.S. App. D.C. 209, 515 F.2d 668, 672 (D.C.Cir.1975); Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 1974). However, because the doctrine is based on principles of comity, its application is within the discretion of the district court. See Sohm v. Fowler, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 382, 365 F.2d 915, 918 (D.C.Cir.1966). When "special circumstances" exist (id.), exhaustion of military remedies is not required. See Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 924, 87 S. Ct. 2042, 18 L. Ed. 2d 980 (1967); Ogden v. Zuckert, 111 U.S. App. D.C. 398, 298 F.2d 312 (D.C.Cir.1961); Calhoun v. Lehman, supra.
Courts have developed a number of exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. It is not required if administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 191 U.S. App. D.C. 368, 590 F.2d 1070, 1081 (D.C.Cir.1978); where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 166 U.S. App. D.C. 312, 510 F.2d 692, 703 (D.C.Cir.1975); or where irreparable injury would result unless judicial review is permitted, Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. N.L.R.B., 153 U.S. App. D.C. 380, 473 F.2d 91, 93 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 950, 94 S. Ct. 1474, 39 L. Ed. 2d 566 (1974). However, none of these exceptions apply here. In fact, the defendants have submitted an affidavit
which, they contend, shows that Walters would have definitely received an upgrade of his discharge had he pursued his administrative remedies. That result, they point out, is required by two current military regulations, 32 C.F.R. §§ 41.7(f) and 70.6(c)(1)(ii). Section 41.7(f) requires that servicemembers who are discharged from the military today based on evidence gathered during a compelled urinalysis must receive an honorable discharge.
Section 70.6(c)(1)(ii) mandates that a discharge review board apply the current regulation-i.e., section 41.7(f)-in reviewing the propriety of a less than honorable discharge.
However, while the standard exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine do not apply here, neither do the often stated reasons for requiring exhaustion. Those reasons are several: the discharge board or the agency must be given the opportunity to develop a factual record and apply its expertise to that record and courts should strive to avoid "piecemeal" appeals. Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 201 U.S. App. D.C. 165, 627 F.2d 1151, 1157 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921, 100 S. Ct. 3011, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1980). See also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 23 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1969); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 171 U.S. App. D.C. 73, 518 F.2d 466, 474 (D.C.Cir.1974). Because the outcome of an administrative appeal is certain in this case-namely, all parties agree that Walters would have received an upgraded discharge had he not withdrawn his petition for review-this Court sees no conceivable need for an amplified administrative record nor any benefit to be gained from military expertise. And because the outcome of a military discharge board's review is, under current military regulations, certain for all dischargees similarly situated with Walters, this Court would not avoid "piecemeal" appeals by requiring exhaustion.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that application of the exhaustion doctrine "requires an understanding of the purposes of the particular administrative scheme involved." McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. at 193, 89 S. Ct. at 1662; see also, Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d at 1156; Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d at 474. In this "particular administrative scheme, "the doctrine is inappropriate. In fact, rather than furthering any substantive jurisprudential aims, adoption of the defendants' exhaustion argument would result in a "piecemeal" remedying of the effects of the military's unlawful drug detection program. Because the current regulations require an upgrade, the military would avoid classwide relief from a federal court if exhaustion were required for an individual servicemember. As a result, those servicemembers who are unaware of the possibility of an upgrade-and it is highly probable that their number is considerable-
will continue to be burdened with a less than honorable discharge.
Such a prospect cannot be dismissed lightly. The adverse effects of a general discharge are well-known and documented. As this Court stated in Giles: "Not only is a person's reputation injured and jeopardized" through receipt of a general discharge, "but employment opportunities are restricted, both in the public and private sector." 475 F. Supp. at 598.
Application of the exhaustion doctrine in this case would directly conflict with the concerns motivating this Court and the Court of Appeals in Giles.
Adoption of the military's exhaustion argument would prevent a federal court from remedying on a wide scale that which a military discharge board is capable of correcting solely on a case-by-case basis. Such a result would not be sensible. Indeed, recognizing the inappropriateness of the doctrine in this sort of setting, the Court of Appeals rejected a similar exhaustion argument in Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d at 473-74, because "the military tribunals are not designed to handle actions involving so large a class and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief." The exhaustion doctrine should not be used to shield the military from an obligation to correct discharge certificates which have been unlawfully issued. This Court, therefore, exercises its discretion and will not require Walters to exhaust his administrative remedies.
C. The Court of Military Appeals' Post-Ruiz Decisions
In United States v. Jordan, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 452, 22 C.M.R. 242 (1957), the Court of Military Appeals held that an order compelling a urine sample to secure evidence for a court-martial proceeding violated the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination of Article 31. The following year, the same court in United States v. Forslund, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 8, 27 C.M.R. 82 (1958), took the next step and held that evidence procured as a result of such an illegal order was inadmissible in a court-martial proceeding. In United States v. Ruiz, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 181, 48 C.M.R. 797 (1974), the court extended its earlier decisions and held that evidence obtained in a compelled urinalysis was also inadmissible in administrative discharge proceedings.
In October 1980, however, the Court of Military Appeals reexamined the scope of Article 31. In United States v. Armstrong, 9 M.J.R. 374 (C.M.A.1980), the court concluded that a compelled blood sample taken to determine a servicemember's level of intoxication is admissible evidence in a court-martial proceeding. The court reasoned that such evidence is admissible under the Fifth Amendment and that Article 31 and the Constitution are co-extensive. In United States v. Lloyd, 10 M.J.R. 172 (C.M.A.1981), the court reaffirmed its view that the statute provides no greater protection to an accused than does the Constitution.
Relying on their reading of the two decisions, the defendants urge this Court to abandon the Court of Appeals' ruling in Giles and deny the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. They argue that since this Court and the Court of Appeals relied primarily on Ruiz for the classwide relief order, the overruling of Ruiz leaves Giles without any force.
The defendants' argument lacks merit. Neither Armstrong nor Lloyd explicitly overruled Ruiz.
But even if the court has impliedly overturned Ruiz, this Court, for several reasons, need not abandon Giles. Ruiz did not provide the primary basis for the decision of our Court of Appeals in Giles:
Given the circumstances of this case, including the Army's adoption of Ruiz following the issuance of the opinion by the Court of Military Appeals ... we find it unnecessary to pass upon the validity of the decision in Ruiz. Rather, we deal here with certain inequities that have arisen by virtue of inconsistencies in the application of Army regulations 627 F.2d at 557 (emphasis added).
In Giles, the inequities troubling this Court and the Court of Appeals were twofold. First, while the plaintiff Giles was burdened for life with a general discharge, the post-Ruiz regulations
require that servicemembers whose discharge is based on a compelled urinalysis receive an honorable discharge. 627 F.2d at 555 n.3. Second, while the regulations
also require an upgrading of the discharge received by a former servicemember for whom a compelled urinalysis led to removal from the military, most dischargees were, when the Court decided Giles, unaware of the opportunity for an upgrade and the military had made no effort to identify and notify the unlawfully discharged servicemembers. Id.
These same inequities are found in this case. The only difference between the servicemember plaintiffs in Giles and those in this case is the branch of the military in which they enrolled. In fact, because of the relief granted in Giles, the inequities, rather than disappearing, have increased. As a result of Giles, more than 6,000 Army dischargees received an automatic upgrade of their less than honorable discharges.
Dischargees from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not been granted such relief.
Thus, the regulations, and the inequities which flow from both the regulations and the relief granted in Giles, gravely undermine the military's position. The military, it should be noted, in no way questions the validity of the regulations. On the contrary, the defendants rely on the regulations' remedial effect for their argument that Walters should exhaust his administrative remedies. The regulations, like any other validly promulgated substantive rules, have the force of law. See Batterton v. Marshall, 208 U.S. App. D.C. 321, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C.Cir.1980). The Court of Military Appeals' decisions in Lloyd and Armstrong certainly did not challenge the validity of the regulations. As a result, even a clear rejection of Ruiz by the military court would not require this Court to adopt the military's argument.
D. Class Certification
The plaintiff seeks class certification for all former servicemembers of the Marine Corps, Navy or Air Force who received a less than honorable discharge stemming from an administrative proceeding which relied upon evidence from a compelled urinalysis test administered for the purposes of identifying drug abusers. Two of the four requirements of Rule 23(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, numerosity
and adequate representation,
are clearly satisfied.
The primary argument against certification rests on the commonality/typicality requirement of the Rule. In Giles, this Court ruled that class members were entitled to an automatic upgrade of their discharge certificates even if the character of the discharge was based only in part on the evidence discovered during a compelled urinalysis. However, the Court of Appeals modified the order by allowing the Army to initiate new administrative proceedings for any class member who, in his original discharge proceeding, was charged with some other form of misconduct which could have independently supported a less than honorable discharge. 627 F.2d at 558. The reviewing court stated that "the Army may elect to initiate new proceedings for any class member whose service was characterized as less than honorable for reasons unrelated to compelled urinalysis but whose records at the initial discharge proceeding contained evidence of such urinalysis." Id. Relying on this modification, the defendants argue that, at a minimum, a class cannot include those dischargees whose records indicate non-drug related misconduct.
No such result is compelled by the Court of Appeals' decision. Rather than requiring exclusion of these dischargees from the proposed class, the decision merely required that different groups within the class receive different remedies. This Court's determination as to the appropriateness of class certification was not reversed.
The defendants' second argument against class certification is that the discharge procedures differed among the three services. The Navy and Marine Corps, they argue, determined the character of a servicemember's discharge certificate in an objective fashion by use of a point scale,
while the Air Force, like the Army, based the character of the discharge primarily on the subjective recommendation of the servicemember's commanding officer.
This Court fails to see the significance of the different discharge procedures. The Navy and Marine Corps' objective approach merely enables those services to more easily determine whether, if evidence resulting from the compelled urinalysis were excluded from the discharge proceeding, a servicemember's poor rating would nonetheless have warranted issuance of a less than honorable discharge. The distinction in discharge procedures does not alter the common attribute of all class members-namely, that all of them received a less than honorable discharge stemming either in part or in whole from a compelled urinalysis.
Certification of the class, with Walters as the name plaintiff, is therefore appropriate. See Wood v. Secretary of Defense, 496 F. Supp. at 198.