but for the alleged unlawful employment practices of which he complains. However, looking to the practices alleged in the complaint, it appears that the only place the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged discrimination was in the Hyattsville, Maryland service center. More specifically, while the plaintiff asserts that he was denied promotions to supervisory positions, he has identified those positions as sales manager, service manager or chief technician. (See plaintiff's answer 10(a) to interrogatories, filed June 16, 1982). All of these positions were located in the Hyattsville, Maryland service center.
Similarly, the plaintiff alleges that, due to discrimination, he was placed on leave of absence even though he could have continued in "light duty" positions. Those "light duty" positions have been identified by him as sales manager, service manager, chief technician, chassis shop employee, branch manager and office manager (see plaintiff's answer 12(a) to interrogatories, filed June 16, 1982). All of these positions also were located in the Hyattsville, Maryland service center.
Finally, the training which was allegedly denied the plaintiff would have qualified him once again only for supervisory positions involving work at the Hyattsville, Maryland service center. And, of course, the permanent shop assignment which he sought would also have placed him there.
Thus, under any of the three possible situations which might provide a proper basis for Title VII venue in this case, the District of Columbia does not satisfy the requirements, while Maryland does.
This being the case, the Court turns to the plaintiff's argument that, since venue under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is proper, the doctrine of pendent venue can be applied to bring in the Title VII cause of action. Generally, venue must be established as to each cause of action, see Lamont v. Haig, 192 U.S. App. D.C. 8, 590 F.2d 1124, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Relf v. Gasch, 167 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 511 F.2d 804, 807 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The doctrine of pendent venue, however, has been applied in a relaxation of this rule in limited circumstances, such as where the proofs and parties are the same for the various causes of action. See Lamont v. Haig, supra, 590 F.2d at 1135 n.69; Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 185 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 567 F.2d 429 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98 S. Ct. 1281, 55 L. Ed. 2d 792 (1978). See also, United States v. Trucking Management, Inc., 20 FEP Cases 342, 349 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 213 U.S. App. D.C. 191, 662 F.2d 36 (1981). Nevertheless, if one of the causes of action can be considered a principal one and the others are secondary, proper venue must be established for that principal cause of action. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, 321 F. Supp. at 1042. See also Turbeville v. Casey, 525 F. Supp. 1070 (D.D.C. 1981). This is particularly so if the principal cause of action is governed by a narrower venue provision than the secondary cause of action. See United States v. Trucking Management, Inc., supra, and discussion, infra.
The allegations upon which the plaintiff is proceeding in this case involve employment discrimination. In this regard, a cause of action for employment discrimination may be made out under either Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981. However, it is to be noted that Title VII is a statute which has been specifically fashioned by Congress to remedy employment discrimination, while 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is a broader, more general provision addressing contractual, property and other rights. This is evidenced not only by the language of the two provisions,
but by the fact that, in attempting to apply 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to employment discrimination claims, the courts on occasion turn to Title VII for guidance. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115, 59 L. Ed. 2d 74, 99 S. Ct. 1020 (1979). In view of this, it is reasonable to conclude that, in the employment discrimination context, Title VII should be considered a principal cause of action whenever it is joined with a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
This is particularly so in view of the fact that Title VII has been given a narrower venue provision than that applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. As such, there is a fundamental policy consideration which compels recognition of Title VII as the principal cause of action and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as only secondary. Congress, in writing a narrower, specific venue provision for Title VII, obviously intended that Title VII actions be confined to certain districts. See United States v. Trucking Management, Inc., supra. Nevertheless, unless Title VII is considered the primary cause of action for this type of employment discrimination case, the venue provision intended by Congress could be effectively written out of the statute by using a companion cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as a basis for venue and then invoking the doctrine of pendent venue. Since the doctrine applies when proofs and parties are the same, pendent venue could conceivably be invoked in every Title VII case through the mechanism of joining a companion cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Therefore, in order to preserve the intent of Congress as to permissible venue in Title VII actions, the Court feels compelled to apply a rule in an employment discrimination case such as this, that Title VII will be considered the principal cause of action and a companion cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 will be only secondary.
As venue is improper with respect to the Title VII cause of action and it is the principal claim, this case cannot be heard in its present form in this district. In this regard, when venue is improper in an action, the procedural remedy to be applied is found in the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1406 which states in pertinent part:
(a) The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.