file unrelated to the Kennedy assassination, and it can discern no identifiable public interest in him otherwise. Baez v. United States Department of Justice, 208 U.S. App. D.C. 199, 647 F.2d 1328, 1338-39 (D.C.Cir.1980); see also Fund for Constitutional Government v. National Archives, 211 U.S. App. D.C. 267, 656 F.2d 856, 863 (D.C.Cir.1981). Indulging that presumption, the Court finds the FBI to have carried its burden with respect to the Exemption 7(C) claim for other Cisneros records.
III. Adequacy of Search for Acoustical Records
In October, 1980, plaintiff requested copies of various documents having to do with an acoustical analysis of a sound recording of events contemporaneous with the Kennedy assassination conducted for the House Select Committee on Assassinations. He was provided with a copy of the FBI's own report on the subject in December, 1980.
Plaintiff then requested all documents prepared in connection with a January 31, 1981, meeting between representatives of the FBI and the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Acoustics ("NASCA"). On May 21, 1981, the FBI informed Blakey it had no such material.
The FBI's affidavits explain that, when responding to a FOIA request, the FBI searches for responsive documents in its general indices which it alphabetizes by subject matter and individual. Those indices contain entries identifying "main files" carrying the name of the subject of the request and "see references" which cross-refer to other files in which the subject is mentioned.
According to its affidavits the FBI could not make an indices search for the acoustical material due to the absence of identifying data. A verbal inquiry of the National Academy of Sciences liaison in the Technical Services Division did not disclose the existence of any documents in addition to the one already furnished to plaintiff, but a memorandum concerning the NASCA meeting in early 1981 enabled two other documents to be located and released to plaintiff in February, 1982. The FBI conducted yet another search after plaintiff filed his opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment in April, 1982. No additional records were retrieved, and the FBI says, simply, that it has nothing else on the subject, exempt or not, which it is able to find.
To prevail on an FOIA motion for summary judgment on the ground that all extant information has been accounted for, the agency must show that each document has been produced, is unidentifiable or is exempt from FOIA's disclosure requirements. The agency's affidavits, which should be relatively detailed and non-conclusory, are to be accorded substantial weight if submitted in good faith. Goland v. CIA, 197 U.S. App. D.C. 25, 607 F.2d 339 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S. Ct. 1312, 63 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1980).
Plaintiff argues that an agency should not be permitted to frustrate the FOIA by hiding behind the limitations of its own filing system and that, at the least, defendant should have to inquire for documents at each of its division offices or wherever else common sense suggests they might be found. The issue, however, is not whether any further documents might conceivably exist, but, rather, whether the FBI's search for responsive documents was adequate. Id., 607 F.2d at 369. The FOIA was not intended to compel agencies to become ad hoc investigators for requesters whose requests are not compatible with their own information retrieval systems. A requester "must take the agency records as he finds them." Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 678 F.2d 315, at 323 (D.C.Cir.1982); Goland, supra, 607 F.2d at 353; Marks v. United States Department of Justice,) 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1978). The FBI has conducted not one, but two, searches to comply with plaintiff's request. It has released those documents responsive to the request which its index search discovered and otherwise came to its attention. And it has offered to pursue any specific lead plaintiff can furnish to the whereabouts of any other documents. The Court finds this level of agency effort sufficient to constitute an adequate search in response to plaintiff's request.
For the foregoing reasons, it is, this 14th day of October, 1982,
ORDERED, that defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.