signed by the judge authorized a "no knock" entry into the house even though the no knock statute had been repealed in 1975. In fairness to both the officers and the judge, the events took place during the early morning hours of June 9, 1982 at a time when the officers were understandably in a hurry to search the two houses.
Third, the affidavit did not describe the garage, however, the officers searched the garage without the actual consent of Moore or his parents. The Court notes that although Moore stored goods in the garage, his parents did as well, and had the authority to consent to any search of the garage. However, the officer did not request the permission of the Hendersons to search the garage; he merely asked Mr. Henderson to accompany him to the garage for the search. The Hendersons simply did as they were instructed.
Although a number of errors were committed in securing the search warrant, none of them affect the final disposition of the motion. The officers in preparing the warrant cited to inapplicable statutes; nevertheless, it is clear that a judge of the Superior Court had the authority to authorize a search warrant pursuant to D.C.Code Ann. § 33-565 (1981). While Officer Hickson was not present when the other officers entered 514 Missouri Avenue and began their search, he did arrive on the scene sometime thereafter. The Court finds no violation of D.C.Code Ann. § 33-565(f).
The warrant signed by the judge authorized a no knock entry, and as noted, the statute authorizing no knock entries was repealed in 1975. It is quite clear however that the officers knocked, identified themselves, and were allowed to enter the premises by Mr. and Mrs. Henderson. Likewise, although the warrant authorized the search of the entire premises, including the apartment occupied by the Hendersons, and although the officers did search the Hendersons' apartment, the cocaine and marijuana were found in Moore's apartment. Although the search warrant, did not on its face allow the search of the garage, and the officers searched the garage without the permission of Moore or his parents, they found nothing in the garage. Since no evidence was found in either the garage or the apartment occupied by the Hendersons, no one was harmed, insofar as this case is concerned, due to the errors contained in the affidavit and the warrant. Clearly, there was probable cause to search Mr. Moore's apartment under the circumstances of this case.
Moore complains that the reference to the special employee contained in the affidavit did not recite her reliability and credibility and therefore did not comport with the decisions in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964). While Moore correctly notes that the affidavit does not set forth facts relating to the reliability or credibility of SE, issuance of the search warrant was nevertheless proper based upon the totality of the facts set forth in that affidavit. The affidavit states that SE had observed cocaine and marijuana within the premises within the last 48 hours. The affidavit further sets forth that SE had made arrangements with Moore to purchase four ounces of cocaine and thirty pounds of marijuana for $19,600, that SE and the undercover officer met Moore and a companion at the Capital City Inn on June 8, 1982, and that Moore at that time had agreed to sell four ounces of cocaine for approximately $2,200 an ounce. Thus, the independent observations of the undercover officer, and the monitored telephone conversations between SE and Moore, corroborated the representations made by SE and the requirements of Spinelli were satisfied.
Taking all of the above matters into consideration, the Court concludes that Moore's motion to suppress the evidence found at 514 Missouri Avenue, N.W. must be denied.
It is hereby
ORDERED that the defendants motions to dismiss the indictment are denied, and it is further
ORDERED that the defendants motion to sever the counts in the indictment are denied, and it is further
ORDERED that Bright's oral motion for a severance and a separate trial is denied, and it is further
ORDERED that the defendants motion to suppress the evidence found in the pickup truck is denied, and it is further
ORDERED that Moore's motion to suppress the evidence found at 514 Missouri Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., is denied, and it is further
ORDERED that this case is set down for a trial on December 1, 1982 at 10:00 a.m., the defendants have been previously advised of that date and have been released on bond.*
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