preferred. In a case not involving such doubtful evidence as an unstipulated polygraph examination, the Court would remand to the Board for a more complete discussion. Here, the burden of explanation was lessened further because the Board provided an adequate statement of reasons at the time it denied plaintiff's previous applications. See Roelofs v. Secretary of the Air Force, 202 U.S. App. D.C. 307, 628 F.2d 594, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (burden of stating findings or explaining reasoning "is lessened if the agency provides at least some statement of reasons at the time it takes its actions"). While the Board's latest determination lacks precision and clarity, the record does not show material factual or legal error sufficient to "overcome the strong, but rebuttable, presumption that administrators of the military, like other public officers, discharge their duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith." Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (1979).
D. Weight of the evidence
This is not a case where the Army has admitted an improper evaluation of an officer's conduct. Cf. Sanders v. United States, supra, at 808 (four erroneous OERs acknowledged but not removed from file either through mistake or inadvertence); Skinner v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 322, 594 F.2d 824, 827-28 (1979) (agency acknowledged that plaintiff's rating was improperly influenced downward); Yee v. United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 388, 512 F.2d 1383, 1386 (1975) (Air Force failed to explain adequately five-year gap in plaintiff's OERs caused by its illegal discharge of plaintiff).
Major Moore has an exemplary service record and has handled innumerable other vouchers without controversy. See generally, A.R. 2. However, the Army and the Board simply did not credit his explanation for submitting a particular voucher. That determination was not a "gross material error of fact or an action contrary to all (the) evidence." Sanders, supra, at 813. A court may disagree with a correction board about whether or not a specific situation was unjust, but it will not substitute its judgment for the board's where, as here, "reasonable minds could reach differing conclusions." Id., at 814.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Board appealed by Major Moore.
Plaintiff has moved to strike defendant's motion for failure to file a statement of material facts pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 1-9(h). The Court denies this motion. Other appeals from the Board have been resolved upon Rule 7(b)(1) motions. See, e.g., Heisig v. Secretary of the Army, 554 F. supp. 623 (D.D.C. 1982) (memorandum and order). The Court is restricted to the administrative record. In such a case, a court may order judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) or may grant an order pursuant to a motion under Rule 7(b)(1). See Igonia v. Califano, 186 U.S. App. D.C. 161, 568 F.2d 1383, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1977). A statement of material facts under Local Rule 1-9(h) is required only with motions for summary judgment.
An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 568 F. Supp.]
Upon consideration of defendants' motion for a judgment of affirmance, plaintiff's response, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, defendants' opposition, plaintiff's motion to strike or in the alternative for an order directing compliance, defendants' response, and the entire record in this action, for the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum opinion, it is by the Court this 16th day of February 1983,
ORDERED that defendants' motion for a judgment of affirmance pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1) is granted; it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied; it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to strike, or in the alternative, for an order directing compliance is denied; it is further
ORDERED that the decision of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records appealed by plaintiff is affirmed; and it is further
ORDERED that this action is dismissed.
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