B. Equal Protection
The equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause confers a federal constitutional right to be free from classifications by gender which do not serve important governmental objectives and are not substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S. Ct. 451, 456, 50 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1976). Congressional employees have a cause of action with a remedy of damages under the Fifth Amendment for violation of that right. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35, 248-49, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 2271, 2278-2279, 60 L. Ed. 2d 846 (1979).
Davis v. Passman, however, did not incorporate into the Fifth Amendment the broad inferences of discrimination permissible under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., To apply the elements of a prima facie Title VII or ADEA case to congressional employees like Ms. Witty would negate Congress' exclusion of its non-competitive service employees from Title VII and ADEA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Title VII) and 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (ADEA).
In establishing Ms. Davis' right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court cited cases involving gender discrimination by generic classifications. Id., at 234-35, 99 S. Ct. at 2271. Ms. Witty does not allege that defendants discharged other female employees or older employees from the House Beauty Shop.
In Davis v. Passman, supra, Representative Passman told his female deputy administrative assistant that although she was "able, energetic and a very hard worker . . ., it was essential that the understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man." Id., at 230, 99 S. Ct. at 2269. That comment was the type of generic classification prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Ms. Witty's allegations that a man was hired in her place and that defendants knew or should have known it would be difficult for a woman of her age to find similar employment do not state a claim of discrimination on the basis of classification by gender or age.
C. Liberty Interest
A person has the right to notice and an opportunity for a hearing to clear his "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity" from a charge by the State in discharging him that "might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). Defendants made no such charge against Ms. Witty in discharging her; the letter of dismissal did not stigmatize plaintiff. The only part of the letter in the record gave Ms. Witty nearly a month's notice and terminated her services "with regret." The facts alleged by plaintiff show that defendants have not disclosed information about plaintiff "of such a derogatory nature as to infringe a liberty interest" in obtaining other employment or maintaining her reputation in the community. Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 183 U.S. App. D.C. 182, 562 F.2d 701, 712 (D.C.Cir.1978). Silence as to the reason for dismissal "does not provide the basis for an injury to professional reputation which is constitutional in dimension." Boland v. Blakey, 211 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 655 F.2d 1231, 1232 (D.C.Cir.1981).
In summary, the statutes and rules authorizing discharge with or without cause, the absence of any stigma attaching to plaintiff from her discharge, and the absence of any conceivable showing that defendants classified Ms. Witty on the basis of gender or age discrimination persuade the Court that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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