transporting new liners to replace the old, worn ones when he was injured.
In Pfeiffer, supra, and Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 265-279, 53 L. Ed. 2d 320, 97 S. Ct. 2348 (1977), the Supreme Court has read the term "maritime employment" broadly and held that all persons "moving cargo directly from ship to land transportation are engaged in maritime employment. . . . A worker responsible for some portion of that activity is as much as integral part of the process of loading or unloading a ship as a person who participates in the entire process." Pfeiffer, supra 444 U.S. at 82-83. The plaintiffs in Pfeiffer were found to be covered by the LHWCA because they were "engaged in intermediate steps of moving cargo between ship and land transportation." Id.
Although there are no cases on the issue in the District of Columbia, cases in other circuits make it clear that persons engaged "in intermediate steps of moving cargo between ship and land transportation" includes those who maintain and repair the automated equipment that has largely replaced traditional use of longshoremen and those who maintain structures housing the same. See Graziano v. General Dynamics Corp., 663 F.2d 340 (1st Cir. 1981), (LHWCA covers maintenance of structures housing shipyard machinery); Price v. Norfolk and Western Railway, 618 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1980), (Railway employee injured while painting support structure of equipment used to load grain onto ships was covered by LHWCA and not FELA); Hullinghorst Industries, Inc. v. Carroll, 650 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163, 71 L. Ed. 2d 319, 102 S. Ct. 1037 (1982), (LHWCA applies to carpenter injured while constructing scaffolding for other employees to use in repair of loading machinery); Garvey Grain Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 639 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1981), (LHWCA applies to employee performing general maintenance at grain loading facility).
Plaintiff admits to spending the great majority of his employment performing such maintenance and consequently is clearly covered by the LHWCA. The only argument plaintiff makes to the contrary is the assertion that his functions should be characterized as essential to the "traditional railroading task of unloading railroad cars." Plaintiff does not dispute, as indeed he cannot, that his functions are also essential to the traditional longshoreman's task of loading ships. The distinction is purely semantic and does not pose a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Summary judgment is granted defendant and the case is dismissed.
An appropriate Order is filled herewith.
For the reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum filed herewith, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that defendant's motion to strike paragraphs 33 and 34 from the affidavit of John F. Harmon is moot.