of the witnesses would be served and the documents would more easily be available if the Court were to defer to the British tribunal.
Defendants' argument based on the convenience of witnesses has little validity when advanced in the context of a lawsuit involving transatlantic air passenger carriers. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that these carriers provide frequent flights between the continents; that the time involved and the expense of transporting witnesses would be minimal;
and that all the defendants maintain extensive business establishments in the United States, including, of course, numerous ticket offices.
Beyond that, there is the key fact of the configuration of the alleged conspiracy. If there was a conspiracy, the United States was its hub and the various countries in Europe were its spokes. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 90 L. Ed. 1557, 66 S. Ct. 1239 (1946). Insofar as transatlantic traffic is concerned -- the focus of the complaint -- each of the non-American air carriers provides service between a particular European country and the United States.
On that basis, a court in the United States is a far more logical forum than a tribunal elsewhere, for it is here that all the strands, or spokes, come together.
These considerations have direct applicability to the controversy regarding the appropriateness of this Court as a forum versus that of the British tribunal. In the final analysis, what reason is there to ascribe to a British court the responsibility to hear and decide this matter? Only two of the ten defendants are British. Two of the American defendants (the two McDonnell Douglas companies) are firmly located in the United States. The airlines anchored on the European continent (KLM, Sabena, Lufthansa, and Swissair) operate for purposes of this case between the United States and the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, and Switzerland, bypassing Great Britain.
That leaves the three British parties -- the plaintiff Laker and the two defendants British Airways and British Caledonian Airways. If it be assumed that a British court is to be preferred under forum non conveniens principles to the forum provided by an American court simply because two defendants are British, a similar rationale would apply to courts in Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands, for each of these nations contributes an air carrier to the defense table.
But would it make any sense to hold that Zurich, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Brussels, or indeed London, are so clearly more logical, so clearly more convenient than a court in the United States that under forum non conveniens tribunals in each of these cities could oust the American court of jurisdiction, and further that they could do so even though the United States is the only place where all the alleged conspirators provided the services which are the subject of this lawsuit, and even though the plaintiff filed its action here? It is a compliment to the din of repetition and emphasis supplied by defendants' able counsel that such an argument would even be taken seriously. As concerns, finally, the fact that Laker, the plaintiff, is a resident of Great Britain, the Court detailed on March 9, 1983, why in its view this is not an adequate basis for laying jurisdiction in Britain rather than in the United States.
It might be added in the forum non conveniens context that the plaintiff has not complained that this Court is not a convenient forum; surely the defendants cannot register that complaint for plaintiff.
For these reasons, absent specific and persuasive evidence to the contrary,
a court in the United States must be deemed to be a more convenient forum than a British court or any tribunal in the individual "spoke" countries. To be sure, a trial here will require the movement of witnesses and documents, but certainly the "hub" of the alleged conspiracy is a far more logical place even in that respect, for wherever the trial will be held witnesses and documents will have to be transported. In view of the way transatlantic air traffic is structured -- with one "western" terminal in the United States, and multiple "eastern" terminals in several European countries, the location and accessibility of persons and documents are far more likely to be here than there. When, finally, to these considerations is added the fact that two of the air carrier defendants and the only two non-air carrier defendants are United States corporations based in the United States, the logic of a trial in this country, when compared to any other place that has been suggested, appears overwhelming.
The defendants are telling the Court that they have decided, for their own good reasons, not to bring the forum non conveniens issue before this Court;
that none of the procedural means chosen or which might be chosen by plaintiff for raising the issue is appropriate; and that in any event many facts bearing upon the issue remain to be developed and that until that has been done a court would not be justified in even considering the forum non conveniens question. All of these arguments suffer from a singular lack of credibility
if only because defendants see none of those impediments in the parallel British litigation.
There, in fact, defendants are marching full speed ahead, asking the tribunal to decide the very questions which they here allege to be premature.
Justice is blind; but courts nevertheless do see what there is clearly to be seen. What is apparent is that the defendants, secure in the knowledge that no liability attaches to their activities under the laws of Great Britain, are seeking to have the matter decided in the British tribunal rather than in an American court.
But a United States court, bound to enforce the Sherman Act with respect to those who are resident in or are doing business in the United States, would not be justified in regarding defendants' desire to litigate in Britain -- because they expect there to be exonerated -- as a search for a more convenient forum. That is not what the doctrine of forum non conveniens is all about.
As indicated in Part II supra, the Court does not consider valid in the context of this case the argument that a determination on forum non conveniens may be made only on the basis of an exhaustive factual analysis and that such an analysis is not yet possible. As the Supreme Court has stated, "such detail is not necessary." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at 258. Nevertheless, in the interest of completeness, it is appropriate also to discuss the forum non conveniens issue on the basis of certain rules which require for their application little or no specific factual foundation.
In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, the Supreme Court was confronted with a forum non conveniens claim asserted in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in an action arising out of an air crash in Scotland. The Court discussed at some length the relevant private interests and public factors bearing upon the decision, ultimately holding that the district court's decision in favor of a trial in Scotland was not unreasonable, and rejecting the court of appeals' view that a plaintiff may defeat a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds merely by showing that the substantive law which would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to him than that of the present forum. Such a rule, said the Court, would render forum non conveniens decisions unduly difficult of application for they would require the courts to engage preliminarily in complex exercises in comparative law. The Court then went on to state, however, that "if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice." 454 U.S. at 254.
As this Court observed in its March 9, 1983 Opinion, that is precisely the situation in this case. British courts could not
and would not
enforce the American antitrust laws. As for British substantive law, it fails entirely, for a number of reasons, to recognize liability for the acts which the defendants are alleged to have committed. See Opinion of March 9, 1983 at p. 29. That being so, this case is precisely within that group of cases which the Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft said should not be dismissed.
It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. It would be a cruel hoax on the plaintiff to oust it from a court where its allegations, if proved, would entitle it to recovery, and to relegate it instead, in the name of "convenience," to a tribunal which, on the facts alleged, would not be justified under its own laws in entering judgment in plaintiff's favor. Moreover, what is involved here is not an obscure, technical law in the enforcement of which the American courts could be said to have no significant interest. What is in jeopardy is the enforcement of the Sherman Act with respect to a market -- travel between the United States and Europe -- in which this nation has the highest interest.
The Sherman Act, as has often been observed, is our charter of economic liberty, comparable to the importance of the Bill of Rights with respect to personal freedom, and there is thus the highest kind of public interest in preventing the Act from being emasculated in this important area by use of an essentially logistical rule.
In short, the public interest factors noted by the Court of Appeals in Pain, supra, strongly favor plaintiff's choice of forum.
In view of these considerations, it is not surprising that it has flatly been held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply to antitrust actions. See Industrial Investment Development Corporation v. Mitsui Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007, 103 S. Ct. 1244, 75 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1983), where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, confronted with an appeal from a decision that Indonesia was a more convenient forum, held that in view of the venue provisions of the antitrust laws (15 U.S.C. § 22) and the fact that the Sherman Act is a quasi-penal statute, an antitrust action may never be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. See also El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 444 F. Supp. 845, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) where a forum non conveniens motion was denied as "frivolous since the plaintiffs could not institute a Sherman Act or comparable suit in Bolivia." The Court fully agrees with Mitsui.
Antitrust cases are unlike litigation involving contracts, torts, or other matters recognized in some form in every nation. A plaintiff who seeks relief by means of one of these types of actions may appropriately be sent to the courts of another nation where presumably he will be granted, at least approximately, what he is due. But the antitrust laws of the United States embody a specific congressional purpose to encourage the bringing of private claims in the American courts in order that the national policy against monopoly may be vindicated. To relegate a plaintiff to the courts of a nation which does not recognize these antitrust principles would be to defeat this congressional direction by means of a wholly inappropriate procedural device. That is an action which the Court cannot and will not take.
For these reasons, plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is being granted by an order issued this date.
For the reasons stated in the Opinion filed this date in the above-captioned case, it is this 3rd day of May, 1983,
ORDERED That plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment be and it hereby is granted.