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June 13, 1983


The opinion of the court was delivered by: GREEN

 This matter is before the Court upon defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment in which he is charged with four counts of making false statements in documents within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Defendant is alleged to have made false statements concerning his financial status on the financial disclosure reports he was required to file with the United States House of Representatives in 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (EIGA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-09. Defendant is a United States Congressman representing the second district of the State of Idaho. Defendant makes three arguments in support of his motion to dismiss: (1) that the financial disclosure requirements of EIGA are not subject to criminal sanctions under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 because Congress intended that they be enforced only by civil measures, (2) that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution protects him from any prosecution concerning his EIGA reports, and (3) that he is the victim of selective prosecution. Defendant also has filed a motion for leave to take discovery relevant to the selective prosecution issue. Oral argument on these questions was heard on June 3, 1983. For the reasons which follow, defendant's motions shall be denied.

 I. The Applicability of Section 1001 to False Statements Within EIGA Reports

 On its face, section 1001 proscribes the conduct allegedly committed by defendant. The section, which has general effect, essentially makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully falsify a material fact or knowingly and willfully make any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement in connection with "any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." *fn1" This section embraces false statements made to the House of Representatives. Diggs v. United States, 198 U.S. App. D.C. 255, 613 F.2d 988, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982, 64 L. Ed. 2d 838, 100 S. Ct. 2961 (1980). EIGA requires Members of the House of Representatives such as defendant to file with the Clerk of the House of Representatives annual reports of their personal financial status. 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-03. (Senators, non-voting representatives to Congress, and certain officers and employees of the Legislative Branch are also required to file such reports with the appropriate official.) Section 1001 has been held to prohibit the intentional concealment of material facts by a federal official in the course of completing a financial disclosure statement required by an agency of its employees before the enactment of EIGA. United States v. Muntain, 198 U.S. App. D.C. 22, 610 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

 Defendant, however, argues that it was the intent of Congress to limit enforcement of the financial disclosure report requirements to civil sanctions set forth in EIGA at 2 U.S.C. § 706. That section allows the Attorney General to bring a civil action against anyone who knowingly and willfully falsifies any information in his report or knowingly and willfully fails to file a report. *fn2" A maximum penalty of $5,000 may be imposed. A provision in the first draft bills of EIGA establishing criminal sanctions for falsified disclosure reports, see 123 Cong. Rec. 21007 (1977), was deleted from the act as it was finally passed by both Houses of Congress. Defendant argues that the deletion of the criminal penalties demonstrates Congress' intent that no criminal sanctions should apply to the falsification of EIGA reports.

 At the outset, it must be noted that EIGA contains no express repeal or preemption of section 1001 as it applies to falsified disclosure reports. The act does specify that EIGA's provisions "shall supersede and preempt any State or local law with respect to financial disclosure," 2 U.S.C. § 708, but nowhere in the act is there an equivalent provision concerning other federal laws.

 Nor does anything in the text of EIGA or section 1001 establish an implicit repeal or preemption by the former of the latter as it pertains to falsified disclosure reports. Repeals by implication, of course, are disfavored. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 149 U.S. App. D.C. 380, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1971). *fn3" A repeal by implication may be found, however, only where there is "some manifest inconsistency or positive repugnance between the two statutes." Mercantile National Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 565, 83 S. Ct. 520, 9 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1963). Unless "the two acts are irreconcilable, clearly repugnant as to vital matters to which they relate, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation," no repeal will be implied. 1A C.D. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 23.10, at p. 231 (4th ed. 1972). There is no inconsistency between section 706 of EIGA and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Section 1001 makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal a fact, make a false statement, or use a false writing knowing the writing to contain a false statement. Section 706 provides a civil enforcement mechanism for the knowing and willful falsification of an EIGA disclosure report or the knowing and willful failure to file such a report. Nothing in one statute compels, for example, the commission of an act prohibited by the other; rather, they proscribe the same conduct and complement each other in that the civil statute attacks the lesser offense of non-filing as well as intentional false filing.

 Where two statutes concern the same subject, a court considering them must make every effort to reconcile allegedly conflicting provisions and give effect to both, so long as doing so does not deprive one or the other of its essential meaning. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 156 U.S. App. D.C. 121, 479 F.2d 842, 881 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917, 36 L. Ed. 2d 309, 93 S. Ct. 1550 (1973). Here, however, the prohibitory language of the two statutes does not conflict. As a result, the only matter to "reconcile" is the availability of both civil and criminal remedies for false statements in EIGA reports. This poses no problem, inasmuch as it is established that where a single act violates more than one statute, the government may elect to prosecute under either. United States v. Brown, 482 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir. 1973), citing United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 61 S. Ct. 518, 85 L. Ed. 598 (1941). In Brown, the Ninth Circuit ruled that, assuming the making of false statements on bid forms was a violation of either of two other false statements statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1010 or § 1012, such conduct could also be prosecuted under the general statute, section 1001, with its harsher penalties. Accord, United States v. Burnett, 505 F.2d at 816 (government had the option of proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1919, concerning false statements to obtain unemployment benefits for prior federal service, or section 1001).

 Defendant also argues that since section 706 does not contain a parallel provision to that in section 704 of EIGA which provides that the Attorney General's authority to bring a civil action to enforce Section 704 "shall be in addition to any other remedy available under statutory or common law," section 1001 may not apply to the filing of false EIGA reports. Section 704 regulates the public's accessibility to filed EIGA reports. It makes it unlawful to obtain or use an EIGA report for any unlawful purpose, for any commercial purpose (outside the news media), to determine credit ratings, and for the solicitation of money. 2 U.S.C. § 704(e)(1). The civil remedy under section 704 pertains to such proscribed uses of EIGA reports. 2 U.S.C. § 704(e)(2). The language in section 704(e)(2) preserving other remedies protects the rights of filers of EIGA reports to bring suit on any private cause of action arising from the misuse of their financial disclosure information. As there is no parallel private right with respect to the requirement in section 702 to file correct reports, there is no proper analogy between section 706 (which enforces section 702) and section 704.

 Nor does section 705 of EIGA, which provides that a person who relies on an advisory opinion by the appropriate congressional committee in making his disclosure report "shall not . . . be subject to any sanction provided in this chapter," preclude the instant prosecution under section 1001. First, there is no assertion that defendant prepared the disclosure reports in question in reliance upon any such advisory opinion. Second, section 705 unambiguously limits its forgiveness provision to sanctions under EIGA and does not purport to preempt other remedies such as section 1001. 2 U.S.C. § 705(b).

 Because EIGA and section 1001 are not irreconcilable, there must be an affirmative showing of an intention to repeal before the Court may find the criminal provision repealed by implication. Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 210 U.S. App. D.C. 233, 655 F.2d 346, 366 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092, 102 S. Ct. 657, 70 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1981). Next to the statute itself, the conference report of a bill is the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent, since it represents the final statement of the terms agreed to by both Houses. Demby v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d at 510 (Opinion by MacKinnon, J.). However, because the conference report of S. 555 (the bill which became EIGA), 124 Cong. Rec. 35650-72 (1978), does not discuss the deletion of the previously proposed criminal provision or the applicability of other criminal sanctions to the act, see id. at 35668, the parties have referred only to statements of individual Representatives in the debates.

 The original Senate bill (S. 555) and various House bills preceding the enactment of EIGA contained both a criminal penalty for knowing and willful falsifications and a civil penalty for misstatements. The criminal penalties were deleted and the requirements for civil sanctions were made more stringent during deliberations on the act in the House, apparently during discussions on H.R. 13850, a proposed substitute bill. In response to defendant's argument that the deletion of the criminal penalty indicates Congress' intent that no criminal sanctions apply to EIGA, the government contends that it just as logically could be argued that the criminal penalty was removed because section 1001 rendered it superfluous and that the requirements for the civil sanctions were heightened because of a concern that Members of Congress would be exposed to nuisance suits for inadvertent errors on their disclosure reports.

 None of the statements in the legislative history referred to by defendant provide unequivocal support for his argument. Defendant quotes Representative Danielson who, discussing the particulars of H.R. 13850, noted that

provisions of the bill do not provide for a criminal penalty but do provide for a civil penalty for failure to comply with the disclosure provisions.

 124 Cong. Rec. 30314 (1978). This remark does not discuss the applicability of section 1001, and indeed does not specifically refer to false statements. It merely notes what sanctions are and are not contained within EIGA itself. The statement of Representative Moorhead that the notable improvements of the substitute bill included "the deletion of unnecessary criminal penalties with respect to [the] financial disclosure section," 124 Cong. Rec. 30415 (1978) (emphasis added), does not compel the conclusion that Congress felt that it was unnecessary to include criminal penalties because civil sanctions would achieve the desired result. That Congressman equally could have meant that the penalties were unnecessary because of the existence of section 1001.

 Likewise, Representative Schroeder's observation that "there is no specific criminal sanction for misfiling," 124 Cong. Rec. 30419 (1978), refers to the provisions of EIGA and does not speak to the general criminal sanction of section 1001. Her comments at 124 Cong. Rec. 30422 (1978) under the heading "Failure to File or Falsifying Reports," to the effect that under EIGA intentional violations would be prosecuted by the Attorney General under what is now section 706 and that technical or inadvertent violations should be resolved informally, similarly present nothing addressing the applicability of criminal sanctions.

 The statements of Representative Preyer at 124 Cong. Rec. 30425 (1978) cited by defendant note that under the bill's compliance and enforcement provisions Members of Congress would "not be subject to any civil penalty under the act for inadvertent error or omission in the disclosure." Again, this does not address the question of whether EIGA would not be covered by other criminal sanctions but simply assures the Members of Congress that they would be protected from civil suits for minor, unintentional errors or omissions in their disclosure reports. Similarly, Representative Frenzel's remark that "now that the criminal penalties have been removed from this legislation, against my wishes, I might add, there is only a civil penalty to deter a potential nondiscloser," 124 Cong. Rec. 30430 (1978), is consistent with the applicability of section 1001 inasmuch as the criminal statute would not apply to failures to file. Nor does Representative Gonzales' comment that "it is not a criminal offense to file incorrect information," 124 Cong. Rec. 32013 (1978), suggest that section 1001 was intended not to reach the alleged conduct at issue in the instant case: the mere filing of incorrect information does not meet the requirements for a conviction under section 1001. Representative Bauman's comment that the enforcement provision of EIGA "would have been a criminal penalty, but it was changed to get the bill through the House," 124 Cong. Rec. 30457 (1978), likewise says nothing about section 1001.

 Defendant simply has failed to make the "affirmative showing" of an intent to repeal required by Izaak Walton League. Moreover, the only statement in the legislative history of EIGA specifically referring to section 1001 is contrary to his argument. Representative Wiggins, who, according to defendant, was the Ranking Minority Member of the Select Committee on Ethics when the legislation was being developed, had this to say in the context of the removal of the act's criminal penalty for falsified disclosure statements:

Some Members have been concerned about their criminal liability. Well, they should be concerned about their criminal liability. I hope they have not been led to believe that by eliminating the criminal sanctions in this bill they have been relieved of vulnerability, because they have not.
Title 18 contains a section 1001 which makes it a felony subject to 5 years' imprisonment to willfully and knowingly file a false document or false statement. That is general law. It continues in effect, and that will apply with respect to the statements filed here. Therefore, even though there are no explicit criminal penalties in this bill, the Members will all be ...

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