§ 1962(c) violations by both Katzen and Prudential -- i.e., that they were persons associated with an enterprise who conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, viz., the interstate transportation of stolen goods. The count alleges that Katzen is an enterprise (P81B); that Prudential and Katzen "is an enterprise" (P85); and that both Katzen and Prudential engaged in a pattern of racketeering. Thus, the Court construes Count II to assert that both Katzen and Prudential are persons who participated in the affairs of an enterprise consisting of themselves, and that Prudential is a person who participated in Katzen's affairs, all in violation of § 1962(c).
Aside from the hopeless blurring of the distinction between "person" and "enterprise,"
the injuries Plaintiffs allege are not the "racketeering injuries" essential to a private RICO claim. In fact, the remedy Plaintiffs seek -- which appears to be the value of the materials that Katzen allegedly purloined from the construction site -- flows from the underlying thefts (which violate state, not federal, law) and not from the predicate RICO offense of transporting the goods in interstate commerce. Without a causal connection between the RICO violation and Plaintiffs' injury, Plaintiffs are without redress under § 1964.
V. Plaintiffs' Allegations of Diversity Jurisdiction
The remainder of Plaintiffs' complaint sets forth state law claims, for which Plaintiffs assert both diversity and pendent jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction, however, is no longer available to Plaintiffs, United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966), and Plaintiffs' complaint does not adequately allege diversity jurisdiction.
The federal district courts have original jurisdiction of civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 and the suit is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). For purposes of diversity, an individual's citizenship is equivalent to his domicile. Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir.1980). The complaint alleges that Dr. Guerrero is domiciled in Virginia; that Mrs. Guerrero is a citizen of, and is domiciled in, Virginia; and that Katzen is a citizen of the District of Columbia. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs' complaint adequately alleges the citizenship of the individual parties; the Court cannot reach the same conclusion, however, with respect to Defendant Prudential.
For diversity purposes, a corporation has dual citizenship; it is a citizen both of the state of its incorporation and the state where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). A "principal office" is not the equivalent of the principal place of business. Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483, 486 (E.D.Pa.1973). See also Monsanto Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 448 F. Supp. 648, 650 (N.D.Ala.1978). Thus, Plaintiff's allegation that Prudential is a New Jersey corporation with " a principal place of business in the District of Columbia" (emphasis added) is insufficient to establish this Court's jurisdiction since it does not establish the "complete diversity" required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). See Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 98 S. Ct. 2396, 57 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1977). This defect may be readily cured, however, and Plaintiffs shall have an opportunity to amend their complaint to properly allege diversity citizenship. If Plaintiffs do so, the Court then will consider the other arguments raised in Defendants' motions to dismiss with respect to the sufficiency of the state law claims.