force when the parties themselves agree to arbitration, than where the arbitration process is imposed upon them.
That distinction is of no import. If anything, it runs contrary to the position that the parties propose. If an arbitration provision voluntarily arrived at by consent of the parties, such as that in Drake Bakeries, can divest this Court of jurisdiction, then certainly a compulsory arbitration process mandated by Congress should do no less. In any event, the distinction becomes unimportant in light of the legislative history indicating that Congress enacted the Compact's compulsory arbitration provision precisely because the parties desired it. OPEIU, 552 F. Supp. at 631-32; Senate Report at 7. In that respect, the Compact's arbitration provision is as voluntary as that of Drake Bakeries. Thus, the distinction made by the parties in no way negates the analogy to the situation in Drake Bakeries under the Taft-Hartley Act.
An even closer analogy can be drawn from the Compact to the RLA, which under certain circumstances also requires compulsory arbitration. While "major" disputes, which arise in the course of bargaining toward the formation of future collective bargaining agreements, are subject only to mediation, "minor" disputes are subject to compulsory arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 720-21, 65 S. Ct. 1282, 1288-89, 89 L. Ed. 1886 (1945). A minor dispute under 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i), "contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded . . . . The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation." Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723, 65 S. Ct. at 1290.
For minor disputes the compulsory arbitration procedures before the Adjustment Board are exclusive. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 406 U.S. 320, 92 S. Ct. 1562, 32 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1972); Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 385 U.S. 157, 87 S. Ct. 369, 17 L. Ed. 2d 264 (1966); Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S. Ct. 577, 94 L. Ed. 795 (1950). Andrews and Slocum both held that courts lack jurisdiction over minor disputes which fail to meet the jurisdictional prerequisite of first exhausting remedies before the Adjustment Board.
A suit for breach of contract is a minor dispute under the RLA. Andrews, 406 U.S. at 321-22, 92 S. Ct. at 1563-64; Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 143 U.S. App. D.C. 90, 442 F.2d 812, 818 & n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1971). That conclusion follows readily from the notion that a suit alleging breach of contract is a grievance growing out of "the interpretation or application of agreements." 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i). Thus a breach of contract claim under the RLA can be resolved only by the compulsory arbitration process of the Adjustment Board.
A breach of contract claim under the RLA is easily analogized to such a claim made under the Compact. Both statutes provide for compulsory arbitration of such claims, since both statutes invoke the compulsory arbitration process for grievances calling for the interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements. Compare section 66(c) of the Compact ("interpretation or application of . . . collective bargaining agreements") with 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) ("interpretation or application of agreements"). Therefore, the principle governing the exclusivity of the arbitration process in the realm of the RLA is properly extended to the Compact.
In sum, an examination of the Compact, its legislative history, the Taft-Hartley Act, and the RLA, indicates that the proper forum for the claims raised by Local 2 in the first two causes of action is that of section 66(c)'s arbitration board, and that as a result this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.