MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS F. HOGAN, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Based upon the defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff's opposition thereto, the supplemental memoranda filed pursuant to the Court's request, and the entire record herein, it is by the Court this 13th day of December, 1983,
ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby denied.
Plaintiff, Alicia Perry, has been employed by NASA as an Equal Opportunity Manager since January, 1981, when she was hired as a GS-9 level worker. (Complaint, para. 6.) Plaintiff's responsibilities include working on discrimination complaint programs focusing on equality for minorities, women, handicapped and aged employees. Ibid. In September, 1981, plaintiff was promoted to the GS-11 level (Id. P 7.) In August, 1982, plaintiff was nominated for an Exceptional Performance Award and requested a promotion to the GS-12 level. Ibid. Plaintiff was denied the promotion and the performance award. (Id. P 8.) Plaintiff alleges that since making the demand for a promotion NASA has taken reprisals against her for what in effect is being successful in performing the duties of her job. (Id. P 11.)
Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint of discrimination with NASA on May 19, 1983. (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; Attachment I.) After only sixty-three days and prior to her receipt of a right-to-sue notice, plaintiff brought this action with the court. Plaintiff did ultimately receive a right-to-sue letter from the agency. Defendant filed its motion to dismiss alleging that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) provides that prior to filing a civil action for employment discrimination in United States District Court, 180 days must first pass after the employee has filed a complaint of discrimination with the employing agency or the complaint must be filed within thirty days of receipt of a right-to-sue notice. Defendant argues that plaintiff has not acted in compliance with the statute. Plaintiff contends that this Court can properly retain jurisdiction over her complaint and requests the Court to accept her complaint as timely filed upon receipt of the right-to-sue letter. Should this Court deny plaintiff's request, she would be time barred from maintaining this suit in court as the 30 day period from receipt of the right-to-sue notice has lapsed.
II. The Law
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has just recently noted that "receipt of a right-to-sue notice during the pendency of the Title VII action cures the defect caused by the failure to receive a right-to-sue notice before filing a Title VII claim in federal court." Harry M. Williams v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, et al., 232 U.S. App. D.C. 251, 721 F.2d 1412 at 1418, n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1983) (per curiam, dictum). This is exactly what occurred in the case before this Court. Plaintiff received her right-to-sue notice while her case was pending before the Court, which, accepting the above statement by the Court of Appeals, cured any of her previous defects.
Furthermore, the time provisions of Title VII actions are subject to equitable modification. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1982) (requirement that EEOC charge be timely filed is not jurisdictional prerequisite). In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 185 U.S. App. D.C. 322, 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C.Cir.1976), the Court, in referring to the ninety day limit for filing charges with the EEOC, held:
We need not indicate a view on specific equitable modifications which the courts have seen fit to make. But we are in accord with the principle that the time provisions of Title VII are subject to equitable modification. Nothing in the legislative history compels us to treat those provisions as jurisdictional; on the contrary, the legislative history, although very limited on the time provisions, suggest that Congress intended them to operate similarly to statutes of limitations (footnote omitted). Therefore, to modify those time provisions to serve the dictates of sound equitable considerations would not seem to be inconsistent with congressional intent.
. . . procedural technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process . . . .