Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804-05. Statistics as to C & P's employment practices may be helpful in determining whether a general pattern of discrimination existed against blacks. Id. at 805. Plaintiff "must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a cover-up for a racially discriminatory decision." Id. at 805.
In the instant case, plaintiff did not submit evidence that white employees with similar employment and attendance records were not terminated nor was she able to provide any evidence of racial animus towards her by C & P. See Bailey v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 29 FEP Cases at 1459-60. Plaintiff was unable to point to any comments or specific actions by C & P management connoting racial bias.
Although plaintiff testified that she did not feel that her attendance was the reason she was asked to resign, the only "support" she was able to provide for her feelings was that the white employees talked and joked with the white supervisors; the white supervisors listened to suggestions of the white employees, but ignored plaintiff's suggestion regarding the positioning of the switchboard; plaintiff was made to feel inferior through non-verbal acts of the white supervisors; and plaintiff observed a white operator get up from her position and proceed to file and do office work. Plaintiff also indicated, however, that she did not know if the white operator she observed filing and doing office work was acting under management's instruction. In any event, the Court notes that this does not show pretext. A different situation might exist if plaintiff testified that white operators were allowed to leave their positions and do something that was not related to work or if white operators were given longer breaks or other preferential treatment. In this case, however, the white operator was observed filing and doing office work, clearly, business-related activities.
Plaintiff has not provided any tangible evidence of racial bias against her by anyone at C & P or that racial slurs were directed at her. See Harris v. Group Health Association, 213 U.S. App. D.C. 313, 662 F.2d 869, 872, 26 FEP Cases 969 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Court also notes that while plaintiff accuses Ms. Montes deOca of racial discrimination, Ms. Montes deOca consistently gave plaintiff high ratings on her courtesy and accuracy evaluations.
Finally, plaintiff has not provided the Court with statistical evidence that a general pattern of discrimination against blacks existed at C & P. Of the sixty to seventy operators under Ms. Spencer's indirect supervision, only six were white, the others were black. Of the four Group Managers that supervised at the time plaintiff was employed at C & P, two were black. These percentages have not changed significantly since that time. The statistics simply do not show a pattern of discrimination against blacks by C & P.
Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has not introduced any evidence that C & P's reason for asking plaintiff to resign, i.e., her unsatisfactory attendance record, was a pretext for discrimination.
In accordance with the above, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination against C & P. Moreover, even if a prima facie case were established, plaintiff has failed to produce evidence showing that C & P's stated reason for seeking plaintiff's resignation or termination, i.e., poor attendance, was a pretext for a racially motivated discharge. Therefore, the Court must enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendant on the section 1981 claim and judgment for defendant on the Title VII claim.
An appropriate order is attached.
This case was tried to the Court and a jury on December 9, 12, and 13, 1983. For the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum opinion, it is by the Court this 21st day of December 1983,
ORDERED that judgment notwithstanding the verdict be and hereby is entered for the defendant on the claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; it is further
ORDERED that judgment be and hereby is entered for the defendant on the claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; and it is further
ORDERED that upon entry of this judgment, this case shall be dismissed with prejudice.