The opinion of the court was delivered by: GREEN
This action is before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, plaintiff's opposition thereto, defendant's three supplemental memoranda in support of its motion, plaintiff's two supplemental responses to defendant's motion, and the entire record herein. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment.
On Friday, July 1, 1983, the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command received an initial Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request from Michael Alan Crooker, plaintiff. Plaintiff's letter dated June 22, 1983, requested documents surrounding the testing of a toxin, ricin, which was allegedly performed by defendant for certain law enforcement agencies in the State of Massachusetts. Also in the June 22nd letter, plaintiff indicated a willingness to pay fees for costs incurred in processing his FOIA request.
On July 19, 1983, plaintiff was notified by the Army that it had begun to process his request but that an extension of time was necessary within which to respond to his FOIA request in order to comply with certain Army regulations that are not pertinent to this action. Defendant also indicated in the letter that it planned to respond to plaintiff's request within 30 days from the date of the letter.
Plaintiff filed suit on August 3, 1983, alleging that defendant failed to respond to plaintiff's request within the requisite time and was improperly withholding information that was the subject of his FOIA request.
On August 19, 1983, defendant notified plaintiff by letter that it had compiled all material requested by plaintiff. Also in that letter, defendant informed plaintiff that because of certain outstanding commitments made by plaintiff to pay fees owed to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") from prior FOIA requests and pursuant to Army Regulation, 340-17, paragraph 6-200, the Army would require payment of search fees before it would continue to process plaintiff's FOIA request and forward the desired information.
Also in the August 19, 1983 letter, defendant requested from plaintiff payment of $131.20 to cover the cost of all fees incurred pursuant to plaintiff's FOIA request. Plaintiff was informed that upon payment of said fees, the Army would promptly complete the processing of plaintiff's FOIA request and forward the material.
In response, plaintiff requested a waiver or reduction of fees for the processing of his FOIA request. In a letter dated August 24, 1983, plaintiff claimed that he was "totally indigent" and "in the process of writing a biography" about his brother, Steven Crooker. Letter from Michael Alan Crooker, August 24, 1983, attachment 4, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Aug. 24, 1983 letter"). He also argued that the amount of the fees requested was unwarranted, excessive, and demanded solely for the purpose of thwarting plaintiff's attempt to receive the requested information. Finally, plaintiff claimed that he did not owe the BATF fees from prior FOIA requests and so was entitled to the information prior to payment of any fees.
On September 26, 1983, plaintiff appealed the Army's initial decision denying plaintiff's request for a fee waiver. In that letter plaintiff asserted that the requested fees were excessive, that he was unable to pay the search fees, and that he did not owe the BATF any past fees. Plaintiff further noted that he was in the midst of writing a book about his brother and needed the requested information to support that effort.
On November 9, 1983, the Army issued its final agency decision on the question of whether plaintiff was entitled to a fee waiver under FOIA for the requested information. Although it upheld the Army's initial denial to waive fees, it reduced that total fee cost by $48.00. It reasoned that although some of the search time involved helped reveal where pertinent documents could be located, that part of the search did not directly produce any portion of the requested documents and should therefore, in this instance, not be considered part of the cost for conducting the requested search.
The letter further outlined the Army's position as to the remaining fees which plaintiff wished to have waived. It concluded that "no public interest . . . would be served" by distribution of the requested information. Letter from Darrell L. Peck, Deputy General Counsel, November 9, 1982, attachment B, Second Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment ("Nov. 9, 1983 letter"). The letter further explained that plaintiff's claim concerning his plans to write a book about his brother was not dispositive where it is plain from all of the information available, that the requested documents would serve primarily for ...