on September 16, 1980 and stayed certain portions of the May 20th order pending appeal.
GPO appealed the Court's order of May 20, 1980 and plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
On November 19, 1980 and December 29, 1980, Local 4-B filed motions in the Court of Appeals for leave to intervene or, in the alternative, to participate as amicus curiae. In two orders dated January 8, 1981 and June 4, 1981, the D.C. Circuit denied these motions.
On June 16, 1981, this Court entered a Consent Order relating to whether certain provisions of the May 20, 1980 relief order should be stayed. Local 4-B filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of setting aside the consent order. The Court denied that motion on July 31, 1981.
Plaintiffs now seek reimbursement of their attorneys' fees for successfully defending against the Local's three attempts to intervene as outlined above. The Local challenges the propriety of awarding fees on several grounds including that plaintiffs' are not "prevailing parties" and that its financial condition and national labor policy bar an award of fees. Upon full consideration of the parties' memoranda and exhibits, and the entire record herein, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees from Local 4-B in the amount of $37,245.00 and expenses in the amount of $216.45.
AS AN UNSUCCESSFUL INTERVENOR IN THIS ACTION, LOCAL 4-B IS LIABLE FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(k) provides that "in any action or proceeding under this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party. . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . ." (emphasis added). The Local essentially argues that plaintiffs did not prevail in their claims against the Local because as an unsuccessful intervenor the Local was never allowed to participate in the substantive aspects of the case as a party. On the basis of the law in this and other circuits, the Local's argument must fail.
In Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers, 177 U.S. App. D.C. 77, 543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976), this Circuit awarded fees against a contractor's association that had not been a party to an original Title VII suit, and that had not even formally presented a motion to intervene. The association, however, did present objections to the District Court concerning the settlement agreement among the parties in the Title VII action. The District Court approved the settlement, the Association appealed, and the original plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal. The Court of Appeals "easily dismissed the Association's appeal, since it had not sought to be made a party." Id. at 239. In determining that the Association was liable for attorney's fees, the Court noted:
The first question is whether any attorneys' fees are taxable against the Association under Title VII, since the Association was not a "party." But the Association purported to become a party appellant when it filed its appeal and the plaintiffs were compelled to defend against its efforts in order to maintain their hard-won settlement agreement. This is not a situation in which the court is being asked to enter an award against a person which has in no way entered its name upon the court records. We think the liberal purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are furthered by, and provide authority for, an award against the Association.