The only medical report directed toward the condition of Robinson's back does not provide substantial evidence of the improvement required to shift from sedentary to medium work. This report, which was authorized by Dr. James A. McQuown, reveals that the range of motion in claimant's back has improved. R. at 283. Increased mobility is not, however, substantial evidence that Robinson's back problem has improved to the point that it permits him to do medium work. First, the range of motion induced by a medical examiner may exceed what the patient himself can do. See Healey v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, [Jan. 1980-Sept. 1980 Transfer Binder] Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) P 17,000 (E.D. Mich. 1980). There is no evidence as to what Robinson's range of motion would be if he were not being moved by the examining physician. Second, even if there were such evidence, it remains undisputed that the claimant "did not get significant result of relief of pain from his laminectomy." R. at 283.
In addition, Dr. McQuown's conclusions that Robinson has no cane (R. at 284) are merely statements of present condition -- they do not purport to explain how the claimant's back has improved since the 1980 determination, and thus provide no evidence that Robinson's back condition has changed. Dr. McQuown's report therefore does not offer the substantial evidence of improvement required to support the Secretary's finding of "no disability."
In short, Judge Mason did not consider -- nor does the record reflect -- any evidence of improvement that would permit Robinson to do the six hours of standing and walking required in a "medium" work day given, as Judge Bork found, that he was barely able to stand and walk for two hours a day in 1980. The record contains no substantial evidence of improvement sufficient to overcome the presumption of disability created by Judge Bork's 1980 determination. Further, because the record is thoroughly developed, a remand would serve only to delay Robinson's receipt of benefits. The Secretary's determination must therefore be reversed, see, e.g., Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984); Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981); Rossi v. Califano, 602 F.2d 55, 59 (3d cir. 1979), with Robinson's disability benefits reinstated as of the date of their termination. Nelson v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir. 1983).
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum, it is this 10th day of August, 1984, hereby
ORDERED: that the Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff's disability benefits should be, and hereby is, REVERSED; and it is further
ORDERED: that Plaintiff's disability benefits shall forthwith be reinstated as of the date of their termination.