The opinion of the court was delivered by: PARKER
BARRINGTON D. PARKER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Celestine Taylor seeks review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' ("Secretary") decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act) and for Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Act. Both applications hinge on Ms. Taylor's claim that she is disabled under the Act.
In November 1983, this Court reviewed and reversed the Secretary's decision denying benefits to the plaintiff and remanded the matter to the agency, ruling that the Secretary's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. After giving careful review to the record, this Court finds that because the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Secretary failed to apply the appropriate standards on remand, the second decision denying benefits to the plaintiff must also be set aside.
When Ms. Taylor applied for social security and insurance benefits in 1981, she was 42 years old and claimed to be suffering from such severe physical impairments and pain and her treating physician concluded that she was "totally and permanently disabled." (Rec. at 225.)
The Secretary, however, rejected the conclusion that Ms. Taylor was totally and permanently disabled, finding that she was able to perform "light work" 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The Court reversed the Secretary's determination and ordered the ALJ, in considering the evidence on remand, to refrain from allowing his lay observations concerning Ms. Taylor's claim of constant pain from entering into his decision. Moreover, this Court explicitly ordered that the claimant's assertions of pain be given serious consideration and clearly instructed the ALJ to indicate why any probative evidence introduced by plaintiff was not credited. See Order of Reversal and Remand, November 17, 1983.
Unexplainably, the ALJ failed to carry out these directives. He found that the plaintiff "has hypertensive cardiovascular disease with cardiomegaly, chest pain of unknown noncardiac origin, mild degenerative arthritis of the left hip, moderate obesity, and status post cerebrovascular accident" (Rec. at 234), and that the plaintiff "is unable to perform her past relevant work as a nurse's aide." Id. Nonetheless, Ms. Taylor was found ineligible for benefits because the "claimant has the residual function capacity to perform sedentary and light work activities." Id. With respect to the plaintiff's claim of pain, the ALJ merely concluded that it was "contraindicated by objective medical findings and [is] less than fully credible." Id. Moreover, he dismissed the conclusion of plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Batipps, finding that his opinions were "not accompanied by objective findings to support the conclusion that claimant is totally disabled." Id. at 233.
The ALJ's decision was upheld by the Appeals Council. The Council reasoned that in regard to the issue of pain, "the symptoms alleged are still not controlling for purposes of evaluating disability." Appeals Council's Amended Decision (Rec. at 240). Indeed, the Council specifically held that "pain is not an impairment, but a symptom." Id.
This Court is well aware that its role in reviewing the Secretary's decision is limited; it must not re-weigh the evidence and must defer to the Secretary's final decision as to "the findings of fact and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom," Reyes v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, 155 U.S. App. D.C. 154, 476 F.2d 910, 914 (D.C.Cir.1973), so long as the decision is supported by "substantial evidence" as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231 (2nd Cir.1980). The requisite "substantial evidence" has been construed to be "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 216, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)).
But neither is this Court merely to "rubberstamp" administrative decisions. Davis v. Heckler, 566 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (D.D.C. 1983). And "if it is found, in scrutinizing the whole record . . . [that] reliance is placed on one portion of the record in disregard of overbalancing evidence to the contrary, the Court may then interfere with the Secretary's conclusion." Perli v. Schweiker, 543 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y.1982).
Failure to Consider All Relevant Evidence
The ALJ's failure to evaluate probative evidence submitted by plaintiff or to explain why he deemed plaintiff's claim of pain not credible is "good cause" to reverse the Secretary's decision on grounds that it is unsupported by substantive evidence. Gyurko v. Harris, 487 F. Supp. 1121, 1126 (D.C.Conn.1980). The Secretary's silence on these issues directly contravenes this Court's previous order. Moreover, this silence becomes even more disturbing in light of plaintiff's well-articulated complaints of pain. Contrary to the ALJ's statement that the plaintiff's physician offered no "objective findings" supporting his conclusion that Ms. Taylor is totally disabled, the evidence showed claimant suffered from "abnormal" EEG readings "indicating a structural lesion" in the head region. (Rec. at 186.) Likewise, the Appeals Council, citing a 1981 report of Dr. Gradi's, an associate of Dr. Batipps, recommending that the claimant merely "take two Aspirin, twice daily," (Rec. at 240), failed to explain why it did not credit Dr. Gradi's 1982 report concluding that Ms. Taylor suffered from a structural lesion. (Rec. at 186.) Nor did the Secretary explain why she did not credit Ms. Taylor's many examples of ...