MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
STANLEY S. HARRIS, District Judge.
Defendant was arrested in this case on November 16, 1984, and was charged with the possession of both heroin and cocaine with the intent to distribute those controlled substances. He was released after posting a $3,000 surety bond at the station house. On November 20, 1984, he was processed before United States Magistrate Dwyer. Magistrate Dwyer continued defendant's release upon the $3,000 surety bond, subject to a number of conditions. One was that defendant not be arrested while on release. The release order indicated that if defendant were rearrested on probable cause, his $3,000 bond would be revoked and a new surety bond of $10,000 would be set.
A preliminary hearing was held on November 28, 1984; Magistrate Dwyer found probable cause to bind the defendant pending grand jury action. On December 6, 1984, defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), asserting possession of heroin and cocaine with the intent to distribute such drugs. He was arraigned on December 18, 1984, before this Court.
On January 22, 1985, defendant was arrested again, based upon a tip from a reliable informant. In his possession were found 28 packets of white powder, which were in three separate groupings held together by rubber bands. One packet was field-tested; it was positive for heroin. On the next day, the Government requested a 10-day hold of defendant in his second case pursuant to the provisions of the new 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(1)(A)(i). That request was granted by Magistrate Dwyer. Later on January 23, the Government filed a motion under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 for the revocation of defendant's release in this -- the original -- case. That motion was based upon the new § 3148 of Title 18. It was opposed by the defendant on January 28, 1985. The principal thrust of the opposition was that the defendant, with a number of community ties, was unlikely not to appear for future scheduled court dates.
On the afternoon of February 1, 1985, this Court held a two-hour hearing. It had two purposes. First, it was a probable cause hearing to determine whether defendant should be held for grand jury action with respect to the second charged offense. Second, it was a hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b) to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a crime while on release in his first case.
Following the conclusion of the testimony of the Government's witness (the arresting officer), the Court made dual findings of probable cause. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b)(2)(B), the Court's finding that there was probable cause to believe that defendant committed a felony while he was on release in this case gave rise to "a rebuttable presumption . . . that no condition or combination of conditions will assure that the person will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community."
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 is a part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Those statutes were passed in the latter days of 2d Session of the 98th Congress, and their specific legislative history is slender. However, the provisions which were enacted had extensive prior legislative histories in the United States Senate. Thus, the principal legislative history source for the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (which, as noted, includes the Bail Reform Act of 1984) is Senate Report No. 98-225 of the 98th Congress, 1st Session, the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on S. 1762, which was the never-enacted Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983. At pp. 35-36 of that Report, the following was stated:
Thus, while the Committee is of the view that commission of a felony during the period of release generally should result in the revocation of the person's release, it concluded that the defendant should not be foreclosed from the opportunity to present to the court evidence indicating that the sanction is not merited. However, the establishment of probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a serious crime while on release constitutes compelling evidence that the defendant poses a danger to the community, and, once such probable cause is established, it is appropriate that the burden rest on the defendant to come forward with evidence indicating that this conclusion is not warranted in his case.
The Government expressed no concern as to defendant's likelihood of fugitivity (although the defendant is facing mandatory consecutive sentences pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147(1) if he is found guilty of having committed the second offense), but was concerned as to his danger to the community. The defendant presented one witness, his brother, who testified that he believed he could help assure no further criminality by the defendant if he again were conditionally released. After the presentation of evidence, the Court heard from counsel, including both of the separate attorneys which defendant has in his two cases. Various constitutional objections were presented to the relevant provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984; the Court found them unpersuasive. In then considering whether defendant's release in this case should be revoked, the Court quoted and relied upon the following language from the Senate Report, supra, at 13:
The Committee also emphasizes that the risk that a defendant will continue to engage in drug trafficking constitutes a danger to the "safety of any other person or the community."