to testify to the matters stated therein". Id.
The plaintiff's affidavit does not measure up to the above requirements. She states that for at least two years the managers in her section attempted to discharge her because of her race and sex and that the disciplinary actions reported by Mr. Whitehead were pretexts for the actual reasons asserted as grounds for her discharge. Plaintiff Affidavit para. 1. Plaintiff's statement is no more than an allegation. It does not set forth "specific facts", and nothing in the affidavit demonstrates that she has personal knowledge of the facts or that such "facts" would be admissible in evidence.
Plaintiff states that she has never threatened any person, including her supervisors, and that "what I have said has been taken totally out of context". Id. para. 2. Her own statement is not clear and recognizes that it may be that her statements were taken out of context. The Court need not address this allegation, however, since as it has already observed, it has not considered the alleged threats as grounds for termination.
In the third paragraph of her affidavit, the plaintiff disputes that the action taken against her is the same as action taken against other persons, but this is no more than an allegation and without more does not raise a factual issue. Again, the plaintiff does not set forth specific facts and there is no basis to determine whether she has personal knowledge of those alleged facts and whether such allegations would be admissible in evidence. She also asserts that PEPCO should know "a caucasian male received benefits under the contract for alleged misconduct similar to that for which [she] was discriminated", but again, the statement does not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(e) and does not set forth specific facts, as for example, giving the name of the employee or the nature of the termination.
Finally, plaintiff states that she supplied medical certificates, but again she does not set forth the nature of the certificates supplied and when those certificates were supplied.
The Court concludes that the plaintiff's affidavit fails to meet the requirements of Rule 56(e), and indeed, her affidavit is an illustration of the reasons for the requirement for specificity contained in the rule. All the plaintiff has done is to make additional allegations, but as Rule 56(e) clearly provides, such allegations are not enough and do not raise a factual issue.
After giving careful consideration to the motion, the opposition thereto, the arguments of counsel and the record in this case, the Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is clear that the defendant had just cause for requesting the medical report in question and it is also clear that when the plaintiff failed to furnish that reports or a release therefore, the defendant had the right to first suspend her and then terminate her. Nothing in the record supports the plaintiff's allegation that she was terminated because of either her race or her sex. Nothing in the record supports an allegation that the reasons given for her termination were a pretext for the real reasons.
Defendant also argues that since the plaintiff is now to be incarcerated, the relief she has requested may not be granted. For example, the plaintiff has requested reinstatement. The Court need not address that issue since the Court finds that, in any event, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief in this case.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted and this case will be dismissed with prejudice.
Separate order has issued.