was held on May 17, 1985, and this case is now ripe for decision.
The Court is of the view that this case is moot and must therefore be dismissed as there is no continuing case or controversy. The test for mootness was set out by the Supreme Court in County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 59 L. Ed. 2d 642, 99 S. Ct. 1379 (1979). See also, Doe v. Harris, 225 U.S. App. D.C. 27, 696 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1982). A case is moot if the court concludes with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.
The alleged violation in this case was Griffin's failure to submit or cite teratology data at the time such data was due under the data call-in. Under the statute, the remedy for this violation would be for Griffin to submit or cite such data by the due date or for EPA to cancel the Griffin registration. If Griffin cited data submitted by SDS, that company would also have the right under the statute to an irrevocable offer to pay compensation.
At the time the data was due, one of the statutory remedies had been declared unconstitutional and cancellation was the only available remedy. EPA therefore deferred action until the injunctions were vacated and then permitted Griffin to amend its registration, cite SDS teratology data and make an irrevocable offer to pay.
Analyzed under the Davis test, it is clear that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur. The situation was a highly unusual one in which a portion of the statute was declared unconstitutional and enjoined while the remainder of the statute remained in effect. Of the two procedures envisaged by Congress, only one, cancellation, remained as a viable option. EPA accordingly decided to defer any action until the conclusion of the Monsanto case and at that point permitted Griffin to amend. Such an unusual situation is unlikely to recur.
As to the second factor, it is clear that interim events have eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. In order to amend its registration, Griffin had to cite all relevant data, including the teratology studies in question. The standard of review for amended applications is the same standard which would apply to any new application for a conditional registration for chlorothalonil products. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7)(A). The agency's interpretation that this section of the statute requires the same level of scrutiny for amended as for conditional registrations is reasonable and should not be disturbed unless there is some compelling reason that this interpretation is wrong. Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 208 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Plaintiff has presented no compelling reason for disturbing the EPA interpretation of the statute. An EPA policy of giving the same scrutiny to amended applications and requiring citation of all necessary data is more protective of the environment and thus more in line with the purposes of the Act than the interpretation espoused by SDS Biotech.
Furthermore, Griffin did provide SDS with an irrevocable offer to pay for the citation of data in the amended application. Since EPA has stated that a review of an amended application requires citation of the relevant teratology data, and since Griffin has given an irrevocable offer to pay compensation for the use of the data required for amendment, SDS has received all of the relief it is entitled to under the Act.
SDS argues that EPA was under an obligation to cancel the registration in December 1983, and the only remedy which will make the plaintiff "whole" again would be for the Court to order EPA to cancel the registrations now. The doctrine of mootness does not enable a Court to rewrite the past. It does require that a court consider whether interim events have so changed the nature of the controversy, that there is no longer a live dispute. In this case, where Griffin has amended its registration, cited all the data required for amended applications, and given the plaintiff an irrevocable offer to pay compensation, plaintiff has received all the relief which it is entitled to under the Act and EPA is not now required to cancel the registration.
Accordingly, this case will be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that the Court lacks jurisdiction because of mootness.
In accordance with the Memorandum issued herewith, it is this 27th day of June, 1985
ORDERED that defendant Environmental Protection Agency's motion to dismiss this case as moot be and it is hereby granted; and it is further
ORDERED that this case be and it is hereby dismissed with prejudice.