. . . required for its review of the notice" which, under 12 C.F.R. § 563.18-2(e)(3) should have recommenced the review period;
(2) the Board erred by initially commencing to process Unicorp's October 1, 1984 Notice as Unicorp was allegedly already in violation of Board regulations;
(3) the Board should not have delegated the processing of this particular notice to staff;
(4) the Board's action constituted the granting of a license which necessitated a prior hearing;
(5) the Board was required to hold a hearing to consider the applicability of the SLHCA to Unicorp's actions; and
(6) the Board's failure to disapprove the Notice despite the information supplied to it by CityFed indicated inadequate investigation, constituted arbitrary and capricious action, and was an abuse of discretion and otherwise not in accordance with law.
The Board contends in opposition that:
(1) plaintiff is without standing to bring this action;
(2) the June 27, 1985 Stipulation and Undertaking did not constitute "additional information . . . required for review of a notice" under 12 C.F.R. § 563.18-2(e)(3);
(3) the Court lacks authority to afford the relief against the Board sought by the plaintiff;
(4) plaintiff does not have a private right of action to seek injunctive relief under the CSLCA or the SHLCA;
(5) the matters of which plaintiff complains are committed to agency discretion by law and therefore not amenable to judicial review;
(6) the Board's delegation to staff was authorized by regulation;
(7) no hearing in regard to the notice was required under the SLHCA or § 558(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act; and
(8) the Board's processing and ultimate determination with respect to the Notice did not constitute arbitrary and capricious action.
Defendant Unicorp echoes the Board's contentions. Unicorp also contends that the CSLCA does not grant plaintiff a private cause of action for injunctive relief against Unicorp, and suggests further that if there is jurisdiction to review the Board's determination, it lies with the Court of Appeals.
As a threshold issue, defendants challenge plaintiff's standing to bring this action. This defense must fail. Plaintiff is a party aggrieved and adversely affected by the Board staff's determination and its alleged failure to fulfill its duty under the CSLCA to protect a savings and loan institution and its depositors from a threatened takeover. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
The plaintiff's allegations meet Article III's requirement that plaintiff show that it has personally suffered threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of defendant and that such injury is "'likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'" Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982), quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). A decision for the plaintiff sets aside the Board's assumption that the review period ended June 27, 1985, and makes it unlawful for Unicorp to acquire more CityFed stock at least until August 26, 1985, or until the Board has acted pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 565.18-2(g)(2). Plaintiff also meets the prudential requirement of standing that the asserted interests fall within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute in question. Id. at 475. As our Court of Appeals has recently reiterated:
The zone of interests adequate to sustain judicial review is particularly broad in suits to compel federal agency compliance with law, since Congress itself has pared back traditional prudential limitations . . . by the Administrative Procedure Act, which affords review to any person "adversely affected or aggrieved by [federal] agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute."