with respect to all FISA FOIA requests. See Gardels, 689 F.2d at 1104-06.
Accordingly, because this Court finds that OIPR properly invoked FOIA exemption 1 with respect to the FISA materials, and has demonstrated that an adequate search was conducted of all other OIPR files and revealed nothing responsive to plaintiff's request, summary judgment shall be granted for the defendants with respect to OIPR.
B) United States Marshals Service
By letter dated November 29, 1984 the United States Marshals Service (USMS) advised the plaintiff that it had completed processing plaintiff's request. Thirty-six pages of materials were released in full to the plaintiff, and thirty-five additional pages were released with excisions. An additional nineteen pages were forwarded by the USMS to the FBI, EOUSA or BOP as documents originating with those components, and are addressed below.
Upon review of the affidavit of Florastine P. Graham, the USMS' FOIA and Privacy Act Officer, as well as in camera review of the thirty-five pages of materials released to plaintiff with excisions, this Court is satisfied that the deletions made consisted solely of the names of non-supervisory law enforcement personnel. The Court finds that the names of such law enforcement personnel are exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(6), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), which allows an agency to withhold matter contained in personnel, medical and similar files, to the extent that their production would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personnel privacy. The Court concurs with defendants that disclosure of the names of the non-supervisory law enforcement personnel serves no public interest, and any such interest is strongly overcome by the privacy interests of the named individuals, including the risk of threats, harassment and intimidation that could be caused by disclosure. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 48 L. Ed. 2d 11, 96 S. Ct. 1592 (1976). Accordingly, exemption (b)(6) was properly employed to delete the names of such individuals from the materials released to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff's only remaining claim with respect to the USMS, set forth in his motion to compel preparation of a Vaughn index, is that he believes that additional documents pertaining to him should have been found within the possession of the USMS because he was "under custody of the U.S. Marshals in December 1974, at which time . . . an around-the-clock guard of U.S. Marshals was established in the intensive care ward, where plaintiff was being held in custody." However, the Graham Affidavit indicates that the ninety documents located by USMS responsive to the plaintiff's request were the result of three separate searches, keyed to areas where either the defendants or the plaintiff believed were most likely to have records on him. Graham Affidavit, at paras. 5-7. This Court finds that the defendant has met its burden of establishing that a reasonably thorough investigation was conducted. See McGehee v. CIA, 225 U.S. App. D.C. 205, 697 F.2d 1095, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated in part, 229 U. S. App. D.C. 148, 711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Goland v. CIA, 197 U.S. App. D.C. 25, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978). There is no requirement that an agency search every division or field office in response to a FOIA request, especially where the requester has indicated specific areas where responsive documents might be located; all that is required is that the agency make a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can reasonably be expected to produce the information requested. See e.g., Marks v. United States Department of Justice, 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1978). The USMS has met this requirement. Accordingly, summary judgment shall be granted for the defendants with respect to the USMS documents.
C) The Bureau of Prisons
As the result of the USMS search, four documents that originated with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) were returned to BOP for processing with respect to plaintiff's FOIA request. The four pages consisted of two copies of the same teletype, with one copy containing a handwritten notation and initials. Affidavit of C.B. Faulkner, at paras. 4-5. BOP released the copy containing the notations and initials to the plaintiff, with deletions. Upon review of the affidavit of C.B. Faulkner, as well as in camera review of the documents released to the plaintiff, this Court finds that the names of BOP non-supervisory personnel were properly deleted from the materials under FOIA exemption (b)(6), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), for the same privacy reasons supporting the USMS' deletion of the names of non-supervisory personnel. Likewise, this Court finds that access and identity codes were properly deleted from the BOP documents under FOIA exemption (b)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), as material related solely to the internal rules and practices of an agency in which the public could not reasonably be expected to have an interest, Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-70, 48 L. Ed. 2d 11, 96 S. Ct. 1592 (1976); Founding Church of Scientology v. Smith, 232 U.S. App. D.C. 167, 721 F.2d 828, 830 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1983), or which would place at risk of disclosure BOP regulations concerning security. See Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 216 U.S. App. D.C. 232, 670 F.2d 1051, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).
D) EOUSA and the FBI
As the result of the USMS' search for documents pertaining to the plaintiff, the USMS returned eleven documents that originated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and four documents that originated with the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) to those components for their direct processing with respect to plaintiff's FOIA request. See 28 C.F.R. § 16.42(d).
The FBI advised the plaintiff, by letter dated January 28, 1985, that the documents referred to it by the USMS would not be released to the plaintiff in the absence of the payment of fees to cover duplication costs. In doing so, the FBI essentially reaffirmed its February 1, 1984 denial of plaintiff's request for a fee waiver.
However, almost contemporaneously with the FBI's letter to plaintiff, the plaintiff, by letter dated January 23, 1985, submitted a reformulated FOIA request to the FBI. Pursuant to that request, documents were released to the plaintiff, and no duplication fees were assessed by the FBI. Second Declaration of D.F. Martell, at para. 9. In light of these events, this Court finds plaintiff's earlier FOIA claim for documents and request for waiver of fees moot. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim against the FBI shall be dismissed.
By letter dated February 14, 1985 EOUSA advised the plaintiff that the documents referred by the USMS would not be released to the plaintiff until an advance deposit was received to pay for duplication costs. In doing so, however, EOUSA included the four documents referred from USMS with all other documents previously located by EOUSA itself in response to plaintiff's FOIA request directed to it, informing the plaintiff of a total $375.00 charge. Because plaintiff's claims for all EOUSA documents other than the USMS-referred documents were dismissed by this Court's orders of December 12, 1984 and February 20, 1985, EOUSA should have determined whether any duplication cost should be assessed only for the four pages referred to EOUSA by the USMS. Accordingly, this Court will afford EOUSA an opportunity to inform the Court whether it will release the four pages, supporting any deletions made, or whether a payment of duplication costs is required as to those four pages. Should a waiver of fees be denied for those four pages this Court will then review the appropriateness of that denial.
An order consistent with the rulings herein accompanies this opinion.
In accordance with the rulings set forth in this Court's memorandum opinion, it is this 28th day of August, 1985
ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claims against the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review, the United States Marshals Service and the Bureau of Prisons is hereby granted; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's claims against the Federal Bureau of Investigation is hereby dismissed as moot; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant Executive Office of the United States Attorneys shall inform the Court within 10 days of the date of this Order whether a payment of duplication costs is required for the four pages of materials referred to it by the United States Marshals Service, and, if so, whether a waiver of fees shall be granted. In the event no payment of fees is required, defendant shall release the materials to the plaintiff, and file an appropriate motion for summary judgment with respect to any deletions made.