KELLER v. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MED. COLLEGES

The opinion of the court was delivered by: OBERDORFER

MEMORANDUM

 I.

 Plaintiff, a white female citizen of the District of Columbia, was born in Costa Rica and is of Hispanic origin. On December 13, 1984, she sued her former employer, *fn1" claiming in essence that in February 1982, she was placed on probation for about one month and that her job was terminated on November 18, 1983, because of her Hispanic origin. She charges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. She also claims that her firing violated the terms of her employment contract. Finally, plaintiff claims that defendant intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon plaintiff when it discharged her.

 The case is now pending on defendant's motion for summary judgment. The motion is supported by a meticulous Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue (supported by detailed affidavits and exhibits), and a well-crafted and thorough Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. After consideration of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Counter-Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is A Genuine Issue, and Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as Defendant's Reply, the Court is persuaded that defendant's motion should be granted.

 Defendant contends that:

 (1) Plaintiff's section 1981 claim is time-barred;

 (2) In the alternative, section 1981 created no cause of action on the facts of this case;

 (3) Plaintiff presented to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") only a claim based on national origin so that no Title VII claim based on race will lie in court;

 (4) The claim based on discriminatory discipline is barred by plaintiff's failure to present it to the EEOC in the time required by law;

 (5) In any event, undisputed facts establish that there was no discrimination based on either race or national origin, and that there was no breach of any employment contract; and

 (6) The emotional distress claim is without merit.

 II.

 A.

 Defendant's challenge to the section 1981 claim is well-taken. It has been established since 1983 by the District of Columbia courts that section 1981 claims are governed by the one year limitation specially provided by the D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2544(a) (1981) for civil rights actions in the District of Columbia. *fn2" Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio RR Co., 555 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (D.D.C. 1983); see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 ...