the one-year period governing intentional torts must provide the applicable period. Id. (emphasis added).
In addition to relying upon those two cases, defendants assert that in Wilson the Court rejected the sort of "catchall" provision represented by D.C. Code Ann. § 12-301(8) (applied to the instant case by this Court's Order of May 22, 1985). Memorandum of Points and Authorities at  (citing Wilson, U.S. , 105 S. Ct. at 1948).
Taking up the last argument first, defendants' citation to Wilson as supporting a rejection of all "catchall" periods is inapposite. In the first place, the Court merely stated that "it [is] unlikely that Congress would have intended to apply the catchall periods of limitations for statutory claims that were later enacted by many States." U.S. , 105 S. Ct. at 1948 (emphasis added). Because, unlike the New Mexico "catchall" provision, that of the District of Columbia is not limited in its application to statutory claims, this portion of the Court's analysis is not relevant to the instant case. In the second place, the District of Columbia has no limitations period applicable to all personal injury actions; rather, its most general limitations period governing personal injury actions is the "catchall" provision. See Alley v. Dodge Hotel, 163 U.S. App. D.C. 320, 501 F.2d 880, 881-82 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958, 53 L. Ed. 2d 277, 97 S. Ct. 2684 (1977); Marusa v. District of Columbia, 157 U.S. App. D.C. 348, 484 F.2d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
More importantly, by asserting that this Court should apply the limitations period specifically governing intentional torts, defendants are asking the Court to do exactly what the Wilson Court was trying to prevent -- to pick and choose from among the various state causes of action the one that most closely resembles the particular § 1983 action in question. See U.S. , 105 S. Ct. at 1945-47. Instead, the Wilson Court predicated its holding upon the need to find the most general provision available. Id. at 1948. The goal was not to encompass "most 1983 actions," Gates, 771 F.2d at 920, but "all § 1983 [actions]." Wilson, U.S. , 105 S. Ct. at 1947. Wilson counsels the selection of D.C. Code Ann. § 12-301(8) as the applicable limitations period in the instant case all the more so because plaintiff here has alleged negligent as well as intentional torts. Complaint paras. 26-30. To apply D.C. Code Ann. § 12-301(4) instead would not only fly in the face of Wilson, but would be wholly inappropriate to the present case.
Because defendants filed their motion so close to the trial date, plaintiffs have moved this Court to impose sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 16(f).
Sanctions are appropriate, however, only where the offending party has acted at least in bad faith.
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5, 36 L. Ed. 2d 702, 93 S. Ct. 1943 (1973); Lipsig v. Nat'l Student Marketing Corp., 214 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 663 F.2d 178, 181 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Aero Corp. v. Dep't of the Navy, 558 F. Supp. 404, 428-29 (D.D.C. 1983). Because defendants raised a plausible legal theory in connection with a motion seeking relief central to the disposition of this action, the Court finds no element of bad faith to be present. Moreover, the filing of this motion has occasioned no delay.
Accordingly, it is this 5th day of November, 1985,
That defendants' motion for reconsideration is denied.
That plaintiffs' motion for sanctions is denied.