its prestige. For "Congress has determined that D.C. offenses should generally be tried in the D.C. Courts." Jackson, supra, 562 F.2d at 797.
There is also another option. The parties appear to agree that the Eastern District of California should not lack jurisdiction to try the D.C. counts together with the federal counts. See Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum at 4-8; Government's Response to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Transfer (filed November 22, 1985) at 1.
There is no reason why the federal court in the Eastern District of California cannot vindicate the prestige of other courts quite adequately, and perhaps, more even-handedly than the court that was affronted.
Cases cited by the parties support defendants' claim (in which the government apparently accedes) that the federal district court in the Eastern District of California may entertain the D.C. counts. See United States v. Ford, 627 F.2d 807 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 923, 66 L. Ed. 2d 151, 101 S. Ct. 324 (1980) (sustaining the jurisdiction of a federal court in Indiana to impose sentence, after a Fed. R. Crim. P. 20 transfer, upon a defendant who pleaded guilty to three D.C. Code counts of arson); United States v. Perez, 488 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1974) (sustaining the jurisdiction of the federal court in the Eastern District of Virginia to convict defendant on a charge of assault upon a D.C. correctional officer in violation of the D.C. Code). These courts persuasively reasoned, based upon an examination of the legislative history, that D.C. Code § 11-502(3) was intended to address the narrow problem of the division of labor between the local courts and federal court in the District of Columbia. See Ford, supra, 627 F.2d at 811-12; Perez, supra, 488 F.2d at 1057- 58. Consequently, that provision has no effect upon the federal district courts in other jurisdictions, which are empowered under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 to try "all offenses against the laws of the United States." See Perez, supra, 488 F.2d at 1059; see also United States v. Kember, 208 U.S. App. D.C. 380, 648 F.2d 1354, 1358 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980). "Section 3231 was not expressly repealed by the Court Reorganization Act [footnote omitted], and we do not think that the Act had that implied effect." Perez, supra, 488 F.2d at 1059.
More important, there is an obvious judicial economy to be achieved by transferring the D.C. counts, together with the federal counts, to the Eastern District of California (rather than severing the counts and dismissing them). In light of the foregoing, the Rule 21(b) balancing of interests and convenience to the parties compels the conclusion that transfer of the D.C. counts -- like the federal counts -- is in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the accompanying order will transfer the D.C. Code counts, together with the federal counts, to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
For reasons stated in an accompanying Memorandum, it is this 20th day of December, 1985, hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: that on authority of Fed. R. Crim. P. 21 (b), this matter should be, and is hereby, TRANSFERRED to the United States district Court for the Eastern District of California.