The opinion of the court was delivered by: OBERDORFER
OBERDORFER, District Judge.
Plaintiff, a nurse previously working at the District of Columbia Jail, in this Title VII action sues various officials of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. She seeks injunctive relief and damages on the theory that she was denied a promotion which was given instead to another nurse who was sexually involved with the doctor who promoted her. By Memorandum of September 10, 1984, the District Court (Gesell, J.), entered judgment for defendants. See King v. Palmer, 598 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C.1984). The matter now is before this Court on remand from the Court of Appeals. See King v. Palmer, 250 U.S. App. D.C. 257, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C.Cir.1985). The Court of Appeals stated:
we reverse the District Court's holding regarding the promotion and remand the matter to the District Court to enter judgment for Ms. King and to determine an appropriate remedy.
778 F.2d at 882. The Court of Appeals also stated that
Ms. King also alleged in her complaint and maintained during her trial that she was the victim of a discriminatory work environment and of reprisals for having filed a complaint with the EEOC. The District Court has yet to enter findings of fact or conclusions of law on these allegations. We therefore remand these matters to the District Court for further consideration and entry of appropriate findings, conclusions and judgment.
Id. at 883. With regard to remedy the Court stated:
At a minimum, it appears that the appropriate remedy in this case should include the promotion of Ms. King to the position in question, her receipt of backpay, and a full consideration of any further relief.
Presently before the Court are plaintiff's motion for entry of judgment and for other relief, and her application for an interim award of attorneys' fees. A hearing was conducted on these motions on June 6, 1986.
Plaintiff contends that, in light of the Court of Appeals mandate, "this Court should grant Mrs. King a retroactive promotion to the position of Supervisory Forensic/Clinical Nurse, DS-12, effective September 20, 1981, the date the promotion was granted to Nurse Grant." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment and for Other Relief ("Plaintiff's Memorandum") at 2 (filed April 4, 1986). Plaintiff also contends that she is entitled to backpay reflecting the promotion that should have been granted, together with prejudgment interest thereon.
Plaintiff's contentions are well taken. Although defendants now suggest that a new trial is necessary in order to resolve whether plaintiff (rather than some other applicant) would have in fact received the promotion in the absence of the unlawful, discriminatory conduct, see Day v. Mathews, 174 U.S. App. D.C. 231, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C.Cir.1976), defendants do not materially dispute that they did not press a Mathews defense at the original trial of this action. Indeed, it is not materially disputed that defendants first attempted to press the Mathews defense in their petition for rehearing en banc after the Court of Appeals decision of December 13, 1985. See Petition of Appellees for Rehearing [or], in the Alternative, for Rehearing En Banc at 4-5 (filed January 15, 1986, in Court of Appeals No. 84-5750). Even with the benefit of defendants' Mathews argument, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing, stating in a per curiam order of February 18, 1986, that:
The suggestion for rehearing en banc of appellees has been circulated to the full Court and no member has requested ...