Law in Opposition to KAL's Motion 6-7, (emphasis added), they fail to explain how this case falls within that statement of the law. There can be no plausible argument that KAL was aware of Dorman's intentions. His ticket was clearly valid for passage between Montreal and New York had he chosen to use it. No one at KAL was informed of Dorman's plans to travel to and from New York. For this reason, not one of the cases on which Plaintiffs rely can be stretched to encompass the situation presented here. In all of them it was the unwritten but mutual intention of the passenger and the airline on which the court relied to look beyond the ticket to determine destination. Without this mutuality, the destination set forth on the ticket must control. In this case that destination is Montreal.
Plaintiffs' second argument originates in the fact that this action was initially filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California and then transferred to this Court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Plaintiffs, citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 11 L. Ed. 2d 945, 84 S. Ct. 805 (1964), contend that in this situation, this Court must apply the substantive law of the transferor court. Defendant argues to the contrary that Van Dusen applies only to questions regarding the applicability of state law in diversity cases. This Court holds that plaintiffs' is the sounder view. See, In Re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975); Jayne v. Royal Jordanian Airlines Corp., 502 F. Supp. 848, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Lin v. American Airlines, 454 U.S. 878, 70 L. Ed. 2d 187, 102 S. Ct. 358 (1981); Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 559 (D.N.J. 1982).
Once the decision is made to apply the law of the transferor court, it is necessary to ascertain what that law is. The Ninth Circuit has never addressed the issue of what locations may be considered destinations for the purpose of determining subject matter jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention. Only in one case in the Central District of California was this matter discussed.
See, Aanestad v. Air Canada, 382 F. Supp. 550 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Aanestad v. Air Canada, 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1975). In Aanestad the Court, contrary to the holding of every other court in the United States, held that a round trip flight may have more than one place of destination.
The opinions in Aanestad do not control the decision in this case for two reasons. In the first place, those actions involved facts very different from those presented in the case sub judice. The opinion in the first Aanestad case rested heavily on the Court's belief that separate tickets were issued for each leg of a round trip flight. See Aanestad, 382 F. Supp. 550, 555 (C.D. Cal. 1974) ("Surely with a separate ticket issued to each from Montreal to Los Angeles, Los Angeles was the 'point of destination' not only of that flight but both the ticket holders.") (emphasis in original). In the second Aanestad opinion, in which it was discovered that the passenger had been given one ticket for her round trip between Montreal and the United States with the return leg of the flight left open, the court's finding that the United States was a destination was based on an analysis of the option in contract law. See Aanestad, 390 F. Supp. 1165, 1167-8 (C.D. Cal. 1975). Additionally, in both cases, the place the court determined to be a destination of the flight was the mid-point of a round trip and not an intermediate stop on the way to that point or on the way back to the place of origin of the flight. These factual distinctions make it difficult to determine how a court in the Central District of California would judge the situation currently before this Court.
Secondly, even if these cases were directly on point, as opinions of one Judge of a United States District Court, they are not controlling law even in the Central District of California. See, Starbuck v. City and County of San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450, 457, n. 13 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The doctrine of stare decisis does not compel one district court judge to follow the decision of another. '. . . Thus a decision of one district court is not binding upon a different district court.'" (citing 1B Moore's Federal Practice para. 0.402, p. 61 (2d ed. 1947)). See also, Farley v. Farley, 481 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3rd Cir. 1973); Jensen v. Conrad, 570 F. Supp. 91, 106 (D.S.C. 1983) ("a District Court decision which has not stood the acid test of appellate review cannot be regarded as authoritative, much less dispositive . . .") (quoting Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186, 189, n. 1 (9th Cir. 1965), reversed on other grounds, 385 U.S. 99, 17 L. Ed. 2d 197, 87 S. Ct. 274 (1966)); E.E.O.C. v. Pan American World Airways, 576 F. Supp. 1530, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Although this Court cannot ignore the Aanestad decisions in its determination of how the Central District of California would decide this matter, it must also give substantial weight to the "cogent reasoning of the best and most wide-spread authority," just as a court in the Central District of California would. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 597 F. Supp. 946, 949 (D.D.C. 1985). It is this Court's opinion after a detailed study of the case law in this area during the past decade since the decisions in Aanestad were rendered, that the Central District of California would not find subject matter jurisdiction in the United States in this case.
Upon consideration of the Supplement to Motion of Defendant Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. for Entry of Orders of Dismissal, Plaintiff's Opposition thereto and the entire record in this matter, it is by the Court this 26th day of November, 1986,
ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion is GRANTED with regard to Passenger Stanley Dorman; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that this action is DISMISSED.