In this situation, where the court is incapable of evaluating or controlling the potential for direct or indirect diversion of money within Libya, the court has little choice but to defer to the judgment of the President that all economic intercourse with Libya should cease. The President has made the judgment that all money flowing to Libya potentially threatens the security of the United States. We cannot provide any assurance that Muhammad Mosque's money will not, in fact, inure to purposes injurious to this country. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Muhammad Mosque's interest in the free exercise of their religious principles outweighs the legitimate and compelling security interests of the United States. Thus, Muhammad Mosque's claim under the Free Exercise clause must be dismissed.
III. Muhammad Mosque's Free Speech Claims
Assuming, arguendo, that contributions to Libyan organizations are a form of symbolic speech, Muhammad Mosque also appears to raise free speech claims. Because the analysis of permissible content neutral regulation of symbolic speech parallels analysis under the Free Exercise clause, these claims only require brief comment.
Again, the only issue is whether the Libyan Sanction Regulations are the least restrictive alternative.
Under Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. at 640, we must reject free speech claims based on Muhammad Mosque's desire to voice its dissent through contributions to Libya for the same reasons we denied an accommodation under the Free Exercise clause. To find that the First Amendment free speech guarantees mandated that Muhammad Mosque be allowed to send money to Libya would be to open the door for any group or individual to send money anywhere as an act of symbolic speech. In the face of the national security interests lying behind the sanction regulations, we conclude that there is no alternative that would allow organizations to speak through contributions while still allowing the government to effectuate its legitimate and compelling interests in national security. Thus, Muhammad Mosque has failed to state a cause of action under the First Amendment's free speech guarantees.
In sum, we hold that plaintiff Farrakhan lacks standing to pursue his claims. In addition, Muhammad Mosque, Inc. has failed to state a claim under the First Amendment upon which relief can be granted. As has been indicated, in this situation we are unwilling to second-guess the judgment of the President in the important area of national security. Accordingly, it is by the court this 3rd day of June, 1987
ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, and it is
ORDERED that as to plaintiff Farrakhan, the complaint is dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and it is
ORDERED that plaintiff Muhammad Mosque's claim seeking a declaration that Muhammad Mosque may make contributions to Libyan organizations is dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Muhammad Mosque's claim for a declaration that it may repay its loan to Islamic Call Society notwithstanding the Libyan Sanction Regulations, is also dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
John H. Pratt, United States District Judge