meeting arrest "quotas" established for each officer.
Plaintiff submits that each of his constitutional claims against the named state officials are actionable both directly under the constitution and "indirectly" by virtue of the statutory cause of action provided in § 1983. We disagree. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), and its progeny, see, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 60 L. Ed. 2d 846, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 64 L. Ed. 2d 15, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980), the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action against federal government officials under the Constitution where no other remedy existed in federal law. As expressed in the oft-cited words of Justice Harlan, the implied cause of action was necessary because "for people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (concurring opinion).
Courts have recognized that where "Congress has provided an alternative remedial scheme, which is intended to be a substitute for direct recovery under the constitution [- such as § 1983 -] a Bivens-type action is inappropriate." Gladden v. Barry, 558 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D.D.C. 1983) (quoting Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1390 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932, 78 L. Ed. 2d 305, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983)). See also Hunt v. Robeson County Dept. of Soc. Services, 816 F.2d 150, 152 n.2 (4th Cir. 1987); Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. Reuber v. United States, 242 U.S. App. D.C. 370, 750 F.2d 1039, 1054 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("In a case alleging a Bivens-type claim, federal rather than state action must be alleged in order to sustain the complaint").
So-called "federal action" is not involved in this case. All of the named defendants in this action are state officials or agencies and are amenable to suit under § 1983. Accordingly, plaintiff may proceed, if at all, only with his § 1983 claims.
Defendants contend, however, that plaintiff's § 1983 claims are infirm as well. Defendants deny that there is any basis in fact for plaintiff's freewheeling allegations of a department-wide "quota" arrest policy, and assert that plaintiff is unable to establish that Police Chief Turner or Sergeant Battle ratified or otherwise participated in such a policy. Additionally, defendants invoke the cloak of official immunity as a total bar to liability in this case. Our initial task, then, will be to determine whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case of illegal conduct on the part of Turner or Battle. We then devote fuller attention to these claims in light of defendants' affirmative pleas of official immunity.
Plaintiff's complaint, in a rambling and verbose recitation, attempts to set forth a litany of charges levelled against Police Chief Turner and Sergeant Battle, charges that are embellished in plaintiff's opposition to summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that defendants "promulgated and promoted" an arrest quota policy of the Metropolitan Police Department designed "to encourage, require and exhort [department officers] . . . to meet a specified number of arrests each month." Complaint paras. 15, 16. Defendants are charged with "bringing acrimony upon the police members who did not make their arrests quota, resulting in police members making arrests without probable cause to do so." Id. at P 15. Plaintiff also asserts that Turner and Battle "fail[ed] to properly train, discipline and supervise police member defendants" who "habitually engaged in this practice" of making unwarranted arrests. Id. at PP 16, 26. As to plaintiff's own incident, the complaint alleges that both defendants "took an active role in the investigation of the events that led to plaintiff's arrest," id. at P 17, and that Turner "fail[ed] to properly investigate the unwarranted criminal charges placed against plaintiff . . . ." Id. at P 27.
Plaintiff's catalogue of accusations, once the wheat is separated from the chaff, and as best we can parse it, reduces to claims of policymaking liability on the part of Police Chief Turner as well as supervisory liability on the part of Turner and Sergeant Battle.
To prevail on a claim of policymaking liability, plaintiff must demonstrate that the "official against whom liability is asserted has the power . . . to formulate policy," that the official "has exercised that policymaking authority to generate improper practices, " and that there exists "a causal connection between the policy established and the wrong committed against" the plaintiff. Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Similarly, supervisory or "training" liability attaches when "the official had an obligation to supervise or train the wrongdoer . . .,  the duty was breached, and  this breach was a proximate cause of the injury." Id. at 1260. See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976); Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 872 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833, 74 L. Ed. 2d 73, 103 S. Ct. 75 (1982).
Guided by these working principles, we proceed to examine the evidence plaintiff proffers in support of his overstated claims of policymaking and supervisory liability. That evidence consists of the following:
-- three newspaper articles, two appearing in the Washington Post and one from the Washington Times, "whereby it is shown that it was common knowledge in the city that the quota system led to arrests without probable cause";
-- plaintiff's answers to interrogatories, in which he describes the details of his own arrest, as well as relating his conversations with officers who allegedly claimed that he was arrested merely because "police were making their monthly quotas";