motion, and further, that the failure of Martin-Trigona to receive the requested discovery does not prejudice her or affect her ability to defend against the pending motion.
Another issue raised by Martin-Trigona relates to the arbitration provision included in the Contract. Under the terms of the Contract, Bennett and Martin-Trigona agreed to submit any fee dispute to the Fee Arbitration Board of the District of Columbia for binding arbitration. Contract par. 9. Martin-Trigona contends that Bennett refused to submit the case to arbitration. On the other hand, Bennett contends that he did not do so because both parties would be required to agree to arbitration and he felt Martin-Trigona would not be agreeable.
Arbitration agreements are favored and only recently the Supreme Court has spoken on the enforceability of voluntary predispute arbitration agreements between brokage firms and their customers. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 96 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1987). The arbitration agreement in the instant case was not raised until the parties were well within this litigation, and neither party made an attempt to compel the other to submit the claim to arbitration pursuant to the Contract. Indeed, while Bennett did not pursue arbitration, he did, through his attorney, request that the Fee Arbitration Board send to Martin-Trigona the necessary forms for requesting that their fee dispute be submitted to binding arbitration. Defendant's Trial Exhibit 31. Martin-Trigona never pursued the arbitration claim. For this reason, her claim that Bennett refused to arbitrate or submit the matter to arbitration is without merit.
Finally, Martin-Trigona contends that Bennett changed the theory of her discrimination action when he agreed to represent her. There is no doubt that he did so. In his letter to Martin-Trigona, dated November 18, 1985, he discusses the changes he proposed to make in order to pare the case down to a Title VII nonjury case. Martin-Trigona has presented nothing to suggest that she was unaware of the decision to change the case, or that she did not consent to the change.
In sum, the Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Judgment will be entered by the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount of $ 25,735.04, plus interest as provided by law.
An appropriate order has been filed.
ORDER - May 9, 1988, Filed
This comes before the Court on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. After giving careful consideration to the motion, the opposition thereto, and the record in this case, the Court concludes, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, that the plaintiff's motion should be granted and that judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $ 25,735.04, plus interest as provided by law.
It is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted, and it is further
ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $ 25,735.04, plus interest as provided by law.