98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). There has been no allegation in this case that a policy of the District of Columbia caused the harm alleged by plaintiff. See Harris v. District of Columbia, 652 F. Supp. 154, 156-158 (D.D.C. 1986) (plaintiff failed to allege that a policy of the District of Columbia caused or contributed to her alleged mistreatment).
Additionally defendants' assert that a transfer, in and of itself, does not deprive an inmate of any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1747, 75 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1983). "Absent some right or justifiable expectation rooted in state law," a duly convicted prison inmate may be transferred from one correctional facility to another without violating the Due Process Clause. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S. Ct. 2543, 2547, 49 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1976). Under the District of Columbia Code, a person convicted of a crime is sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States. D.C. Code § 24-425 (1981); District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317 (D.C. 1984).
In Cooper, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that as long as section 24-425 is in the Code, a District of Columbia prisoner can have no legitimate expectation that he will remain at Lorton throughout his term. 483 A.2d at 322. Without such an expectation, a prisoner has no interest protected by the Due Process Clause from summary deprivation. Id. citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-226, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976); Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242, 96 S. Ct. at 2547. Clearly, this plaintiff was not entitled to serve his sentence at the Lorton Facility.
Finally, it is well-settled that District of Columbia prisoners have no due process right to a hearing before being transferred to another prison. Smith v. Saxbe, 183 U.S. App. D.C. 210, 562 F.2d 729, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Curry-Bey v. Jackson, 422 F. Supp. 926, 932 (D.D.C. 1976); Cooper, 483 A.2d at 322.
In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the defendant is not entitled to the relief requested as a matter of law and therefore the defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted.
An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum.
DATED: June 30, 1988
ORDER -June 30, 1988, Filed
Upon consideration of the defendants' motion to dismiss, the complaint and the record in this case, the Court concludes for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum that defendants' motion should be granted. In view of the above, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants' motion for dismiss is granted, and it is is further
ORDERED that this case is dismissed.
DATED: June 30, 1988