formula takes ability to pay into account. Finally, defendants contend that the stock purchase protects the United States Treasury by covering defaults on future payments on FAC bonds, and this is a legitimate and rational governmental purpose.
In consideration of these arguments, the Court finds that although plaintiffs have no standing to state a claim as to the calculation of the assessments, they have, nonetheless, sufficiently alleged that the formula enacted by Congress is not rationally related to the revitalization scheme to survive the motion to dismiss.
C. Denial of Access to Courts
Plaintiffs' third challenge is that Section 6.29(e) denies due process because it requires the PCAs to purchase the stock before filing suit; their right of access to the courts is chilled and restricted by the requirement that they purchase the stock before seeking a civil remedy. As this Court has previously indicated, see Order March 4, 1988, the statute's jurisdictional requirement is constitutional; the government had a strong interest in taking prompt action to solve the agricultural crisis and has provided grievants with post-assessment review procedures. Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 40 L. Ed. 2d 496, 94 S. Ct. 2038 (1974); Haralson v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 267 U.S. App. D.C. 120, 837 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This claim, therefore, must be dismissed.
D. Bill of Attainder
Plaintiffs' final claim is that the stock purchase constitutes a bill of attainder in violation of Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution. Plaintiffs allege that the stock purchase requirement is not a necessary component of the 1987 Act and that Congress intended to punish these plaintiffs in passing Section 201-6.29. Sikeston Complaint, para. 37.
A bill of attainder is a law which legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment on individuals or a readily ascertainable group without the protections of a trial. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 53 L. Ed. 2d 867, 97 S. Ct. 2777 (1977). Merely because the consequences of legislation are burdensome does not, of course, make it a bill of attainder. Rather, plaintiffs must prove that the legislature intended to classify and punish, that the legislation does not serve nonpunitive goals, and that the burden falls within the historical meaning of punishment. Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 82 L. Ed. 2d 632, 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984). This plaintiffs cannot do.
The only allegation plaintiffs make here is based on one snippet of legislative history that indicates that some Senators were aware of the litigation of some PCAs against the prior amendments to the Farm Credit Act, that they "were critical" of these PCAs for "avoiding contributions to the System's recovery," and there was discussion of "increasing the assessment of the associations." Chattanooga Complaint, para. 38 (quoting S. Rep. No. 230, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1987)). This remark does not constitute an adequate basis for a bill of attainder claim.
Here, Congress enacted a system-wide legislative scheme seeking to remedy the farm crisis; the burden may have fallen heavily on the PCAs, but plaintiffs cannot show that congressional intent was punitive. Accordingly, plaintiffs' last claim must be dismissed.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, it is
ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is denied in part and granted in part. Plaintiffs shall have the opportunity to prove their allegations that the one-time stock purchase constitutes a taking of private property for public use in violation of the fifth amendment and that the assessment formula denied them substantive due process in that it was not rationally related to the purposes of the 1987 Act; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that defendants and plaintiffs shall submit to the Court on or before August 4, 1988 a joint status report indicating how they intend to proceed in this litigation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.