The opinion of the court was delivered by: SPORKIN
STANLEY SPORKIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This case is before me on defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment. After hearing several of plaintiff's witnesses (including the plaintiff herself), admitting into evidence a variety of exhibits and receiving a full and complete proffer of the remainder of plaintiff's case, I have determined that defendant's motion has merit. Accordingly, I am prepared to grant that motion.
Plaintiff, an employee of ACDA since its inception, claims that, for at least five years, she was without a position description, title, series or grade as required by the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA") and relevant Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") regulations.
Plaintiff alleges that she was carried as a GS-9 regardless of the duties she performed.
Plaintiff claims that beginning in October of 1981, she was performing GS-10 duties while in a GS-9 position and, accordingly, was entitled to the rank of GS-10.
Plaintiff complains that she did not receive equal pay for equal work.
Plaintiff alleges that an unlawful "overcomplement" system existed at ACDA from approximately January 1979 until March 1985. Under this alleged system, whereby competitive service employees remained in unclassified positions without position descriptions or appropriate ranking, plaintiff complains she suffered harm.
Plaintiff complains that as a consequence of the foregoing she suffered, inter alia, loss of pay, loss of career advancement, loss of job training opportunities, and loss retirement benefits.
Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of back pay, a promotion to GS Level-10 and an end to illegal personnel practices.
There is no doubt that plaintiff, under merit system principles, is entitled to equal pay for equal work. Moreover, the "overcomplement" system that has been alleged is at odds with Chief Judge Robinson's holding in Crowley v. Kissinger.1 However, these facts alone cannot confer jurisdiction in this Court.
The question of jurisdiction has presented a vexing problem. This is a difficult case because of Chief Judge Robinson's strong language in Crowley and my own fervid belief that agencies of the government simply should not be permitted to engage in unlawful personnel practices.
Nevertheless, I am faced with -- and obliged to follow -- the holdings of the Supreme Court and our own Court of Appeals. A careful reading of United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 108 S. Ct. 668, 98 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1988), leads me to the inescapable conclusion that district courts no longer have jurisdiction over the type of case now before me. ...