object found in his pants. The detective sought permission after defendant began to undo his belt on his own volition in order to retrieve the drugs.
Although the Court concludes that no fourth amendment detention occurred, it also finds that the Government has shown that Detective Zattau possessed an articulable suspicion to believe that defendant was engaged in criminal activity at the time that he asked to search defendant. Defendant had just arrived on a bus from a source city (New York) in the early morning hours; he scanned the bus station carefully before leaving it; he appeared to ignore Smith when entering the station but sought to rejoin him outside the station, and he denied that he had arrived on a bus from New York.
The Court concludes that the drugs seized from defendant were not recovered as a result of an unlawful search and denies defendant's motion to suppress.
B. Suppression of Statements
Defendant also seeks suppression of any statements made by defendant, claiming that all statements were obtained as a result of an illegal arrest and detention. As shown above, there was no illegal detention or arrest. The Court is concerned, however, about defendant's post-arrest statement. The Government has represented to the Court that it will not use defendant's statement in its case in chief. The Government seeks to reserve its right to use the statement in cross-examination, if the defendant takes the stand.
In Harris v. New York, the Supreme Court allowed the prosecution to use an inadmissible statement to impeach defendant's trial testimony. 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971). The prosecution had conceded that the statements were inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). There was no evidence, though, that the statements made to the police were coerced or involuntary. The Court concluded that the statements could be used for impeachment purposes, "provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards." Harris, 401 U.S. at 224. The Court believed that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule was still served "when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief." Id. at 225. The Court concluded that "the shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances." Id. at 226
The Court suppresses defendant's post-arrest statement as to its use in the Government's case in chief, but reserves its judgment as to using it for impeachment purposes.
Dated: March 16, 1989
Upon consideration of defendant Corey S. Copeland's Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence and Statements; the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the motions; the oral arguments of counsel; the entire record herein; and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum, it is by the Court this 16th day of March 1989,
ORDERED that defendant's motion is denied in part and granted in part; it is further
ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress tangible evidence is denied; it is further
ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress statements is granted in part. The Government has agreed not to use defendant's post-arrest statement in its case in chief. The Court reserves judgment as to whether the Government may use the statement for the limited purpose of impeachment if the defendant takes the stand; it is further
ORDERED that the trial in this matter is set for Tuesday, March 28, 1989, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 7; and it is further
ORDERED that proposed voir dire and jury instructions be delivered to Chambers no later than Wednesday, March 22, 1989.