harass him because of his race, which began when he arrived at the FBI's Omaha office in 1983.
There is no question that the DOJ, the Attorney General, and the Director of the FBI are bound by the DOJ's decision, and that plaintiff need not relitigate his claims filed at the administrative level in order to obtain judicial enforcement of the corrective relief ordered by that decision. See, e.g., Moore v. Devine, 780 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir. 1986) (providing that "federal district courts have uniformly granted requests for enforcement of favorable final agency and EEOC decisions without requiring de novo review of the merits of the discrimination claims, unless the court has found that the relief ordered to be outside the EEOC's authority"). Summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claim that defendants have failed to provide the relief ordered by the DOJ decision, however, is inappropriate at this juncture, because the position of the Attorney General is that all relief ordered by that decision has been provided.
To grant plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment would be improper for another reason as well. The Attorney General objects to plaintiff's intention to use the findings contained in the DOJ's decision in support of his conspiracy claim arising out of events at the FBI's Omaha office. The Attorney General maintains that plaintiff's allegations concerning a conspiracy in Omaha are time-barred because plaintiffs filed this suit well after thirty days of plaintiff Donald Rochon's receiving notice of final agency action with respect to his Omaha administrative complaint.
As such, the Attorney General asks the Court to enter partial summary judgment in his favor with respect to plaintiff's claim that several white FBI agents in the Omaha office engaged in a conspiracy to racially harass him. Because plaintiff has not asserted that their time limits for filing a suit alleging a conspiracy by white FBI agents in Omaha to harass him should be subject to equitable tolling, and there is no reason apparent to the Court that such equitable tolling should take place, the Court concludes that the Attorney General is entitled to partial summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's conspiracy claim and any other claims arising out of his employment in Omaha, with the exception of any claim seeking the enforcement of the relief ordered by the DOJ decision, because such claims are untimely.
Accordingly, it is, by the Court, this 13th day of April, 1989,
ORDERED that plaintiff Donald Rochon's motion for partial summary judgment against the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect to his Title VII claims arising out of his employment at the Omaha Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be, and hereby is, denied; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Attorney General's motion for partial summary judgment dismissing as untimely those portions of plaintiffs' complaint dealing with plaintiff Donald Rochon's Title VII claims arising out of his employment at the Omaha Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be, and hereby is, granted, with the exception of those portions of the complaint alleging that defendants have failed to comply with the remedial provisions of the August 6, 1987 decision of the Department of Justice.