be forced indoors tonight at the possible expense of their First Amendment rights. This threat satisfies the second aspect of the equitable calculus.
The Court further fails to see how temporary postponement of the New Law's enforcement would cause the District or any other person "substantial harm." See Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 835 F.2d at 318. The District of Columbia has maintained free streets for at least the last 20 years, and it is difficult to imagine that an additional ten days will occasion any hardship, much less "substantial" hardship. As for others, such as the juveniles the New Law is intended to protect, the record frankly suggests to the Court that the New Law will be wholly ineffective in reducing the incidence of juvenile crime -- both that committed by juveniles as well that committed against juveniles. While the Court's estimation of the merits of the New Law may be only tangentially relevant to its constitutionality, the New Law's likely effect is germane in considering the results that would flow from enjoining its enforcement. The Court sees little or no result, and therefore concludes that the risk of "substantial harm" to the defendants or other persons favors issuance of the requested relief.
Finally, the public interest favors reasoned, thorough judicial consideration of laws that may intrude upon constitutional interests. It opposes the hasty enforcement of legislation which may suffer from constitutional infirmities. That interest is magnified when the legislation at issue involves a decision by the State to restrict our childrens' right to walk the streets at night. Certainly, there are those who would contend that the compelling public interest in safe streets demands immediate enforcement of the New Law. They may be right, but only so long as the New Law comports with the Constitution. In the Court's view, the greater good favors making this determination before enforcement, and not after a law mistakenly applied has denied our citizens and those who visit here their constitutional rights.
Because the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have met the standards for a temporary restraining order, the plaintiffs' motion shall be granted. An Order shall issue describing the terms of the temporary restraining order, as well as setting forth the schedule by which a final determination of the plaintiffs' claims shall be made on the merits.
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Upon consideration of plaintiffs' application for an order temporarily restraining the defendants from implementing or enforcing the District of Columbia "Temporary Curfew Emergency Act of 1989," of the declarations and legal memoranda filed in support thereof and in opposition thereto, of the arguments of counsel, and of the entire record in this action;
It appearing to the Court that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their action; that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury if defendants are not restrained from implementing or enforcing the District of Columbia "Temporary Curfew Emergency Act of 1989"; that the defendants will not be harmed if the implementation or enforcement of the said Act is temporarily restrained, pending the Court's further consideration of this matter; and that the public interest favors the entry of such an order,
It is, therefore, this 24th day of April, 1989,
ORDERED that plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order is hereby granted; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that the defendants and each of them, their agents, servants, and employees, and all persons acting under their direction or in concert with them, be and are hereby restrained and enjoined from implementing or enforcing the District of Columbia "Temporary Curfew Emergency Act of 1989," for a period of ten (10) days from the date hereof; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that this order shall be effective upon plaintiffs' bond of $ 100.00, previously posted in this action, remaining posted with the Clerk of Court in accordince with Fed.R.Civ.P. 65.1.