done so in Long despite the fact that the original plaintiff lacked the ability to sue the District directly in federal court, and despite the fact that PEPCO could not have brought a subsequent indemnity action against the District in federal court. Id.
Although the Long court declined to elaborate upon the reasoning underlying this dicta, it undoubtedly concluded that such a third-party impleader action against the District would fall within the trial court's ancillary jurisdiction. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 57 L. Ed. 2d 274, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978)(discussion of concept of ancillary jurisdiction). Thus, by agreeing that Long controls Baldwin's claim for indemnity and/or contribution, the District implicitly concedes as well that her claim for such relief falls within this Court's ancillary jurisdiction.
This concession, however, also effectively disposes of the District's opposition to Baldwin's second claim, which, as noted above, seeks independent damages against the District for her own injuries. If, on the one hand, this Court's ancillary jurisdiction extends to Baldwin's claim for indemnification and/or contribution, despite the fact that the District is not suable in diversity, the District cannot, on the other hand, parlay this "immunity" into a bar to Baldwin's claim for her own damages arising out of the same transaction. The District's citation to Long's holding that the District is not suable in diversity is thus inapposite -- if this were a bar, the Court would lack ancillary jurisdiction over Baldwin's claim for indemnification and/or contribution as well.
It clearly does not; and the reasons supporting its jurisdiction over the indemnification claim are precisely those which establish the Court's ancillary jurisdiction over Baldwin's claim for damages.
Baldwin's claim for damages, as does her indemnification claim, arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact which caused Horton to file the complaint in the first place. Thus, all of the claims in this action involve the same Article III "case," so that the Court's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction does not run afoul of constitutional limitations. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 104 L. Ed. 2d 593, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 57 U.S.L.W. 4557-58 (1989)(nonfederal claim must arise from same constitutional "case" giving rise to federal claim in order for federal court to enjoy jurisdictional "power" over nonfederal claim); Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966).
Moreover, as with Baldwin's indemnification claim, the "posture" of her nonfederal claim suggests that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction would not run afoul of the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 375-76. Baldwin did not commence this suit; Horton chose the federal forum at the outset of this litigation, and Baldwin should not be forced, merely by virtue of Horton's choice, to stomach the jurisdictional limits of this forum. Id. at 376. The very raison d'etre of ancillary jurisdiction is to permit the resolution of an entire, logically related lawsuit, so long as to do so does not run afoul of congressionally-imposed jurisdictional limits. The "posture" of the nonfederal claims in this case, unlike the "posture" of the plaintiff's claims in Kroger, makes clear to the Court that the assumption of ancillary jurisdiction over Baldwin's damages claim would subvert neither the intent of the diversity statute nor the holding of the Court of Appeals in Long.3
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to consider the defendant Baldwin's claims against the District for indemnification and/or contribution as well as to consider her complaint for damages against the District.
ORDER - June 7, 1989, Filed
In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion issued of even date herewith in the above-captioned matter, it is, by the Court, this 7th day of June, 1989,
ORDERED, that the defendant Baldwin's response to the Court's order to show cause as to why her complaints against the District of Columbia should not be dismissed shall be treated as a request for permission to join, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, her complaint for damages against the District of Columbia with her complaint for indemnification and/or contribution; and it is further
ORDERED, that the defendant Baldwin's request shall be, and hereby is, granted.