counsel would have removed her for cause or by a strike if the facts had been revealed, and that a mistrial should be declared.
The Court, after observing juror King's demeanor and considering the entire record, has concluded on the basis of the record, drawing on its experience, as follows:
(1) King answered question #9 and question #23 of the written voir dire questionnaire incorrectly.
(2) At the time she answered she was somewhat nervous and casual, as evidenced by the fact that she indicated that she had not heard of Ronald Reagan by failing to circle his name on a long list of persons whose names might arise during the case.
(3) She had been instructed by the Court not to seek assistance of court personnel in answering or attempting to understand a question.
(4) She did not fully understand question #23, which was somewhat convoluted and had several aspects. (Hearing Tr. 6/28/89 at 42, 64). Moreover, she had no basis for appreciating whether or not many of the events brought to her attention at the June 28 hearing, of which she only had limited knowledge at best, involved a federal or state proceeding and accordingly she lacked complete comprehension.
(5) King wished to serve as a juror when she first received a notice from the Clerk's office, but at that time the North case was not mentioned in the notice. Later, just before she was instructed about the questionnaire she learned she was a potential juror in the North case. She realized the case was important and that she would have to have a clear and open mind and listen.
(6) King's failure to list under question #9 all of her brothers who had served in the Armed Services was inadvertent.
(7) The Court cannot credit King's testimony that she failed to mention her brother Sam's recent conviction by plea of guilty because she "forgot."
(8) There is no proof even indicating what she felt would be the consequences of full disclosure. No ulterior purpose to hide this fact was established. She had been distressed over Sam's conviction and the family was embarrassed. She may well have felt it would prevent her being considered for jury service. Her omission was knowing, but she had no desire to help or to hurt North or the prosecution.
(9) If King had answered question #23 accurately as to Sam's conviction, other facts, by no means all the information dug up by the defense, would have been developed.
(10) King might have been stricken by Independent Counsel on implied bias grounds either because of fear that family involvement with the criminal system would create a hidden bias favorable to North, or because she herself answered falsely under oath before the trial of a false statement case.
(11) King might have been stricken by the defense. In any event, disclosure of Sam's conviction would probably have led to further investigation by the defense and questioning during trial to support a motion for mistrial. Three other jurors whose answers to #23 were later revealed to be questionable continued to sit as jurors when a mistrial was denied and defendant preferred not to accept alternates.
Earlier, during jury selection, the prosecution brought to the Court's attention other prospective jurors who had not answered question #23 accurately. These jurors were dismissed for cause at the request of the prosecution over objection.
One juror who herself had a criminal conviction sat as an alternate.
(12) No proof was presented indicating that King was unfair or that she failed in any way to serve conscientiously. She voted to acquit North of many felony counts.
(13) King was not biased for or against either side.
Situations of this type arise with some frequency in cases when the defense has ample resources. Each must be resolved on its own facts and particular circumstances. They must be resolved in favor of the verdict when bias against the defendant has not been established in fact or by implication. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663, 104 S. Ct. 845 (1984); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78, 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
Defendant has failed to meet his burden in this instance and the motion for a mistrial must be and hereby is denied.