bringing racial discrimination claims may in some cases constitute an actionable impediment of contract rights under § 1981, but concludes that the retaliation claim in the instant case does not involve an allegation of the impediment of contract rights.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant has tried to impede her efforts to pursue her remedies for racial discrimination in working conditions and level of pay; the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant tried to impede the plaintiff from enforcing any contract rights, as defined in Patterson. Indeed, once the Court has concluded that the claims of discrimination in working conditions and pay do not involve contract rights as defined in Patterson, it must follow that the claim of retaliation against the plaintiff for pursuing these other claims also is not a claim that involves contract rights.
Finally, although the plaintiff's complaint states that the defendant "owes a common law or statutory duty to refrain from discriminating against plaintiff on the basis of her race," Amended Complaint para. 7, the Court knows of and has been informed of no such "common law" cause of action.
Accordingly, pursuant to Patterson, the Court concludes that it is appropriate to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment -- without reaching the merits of the claims of discrimination and retaliation -- because the plaintiff's claims are not actionable under § 1981. It is
ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
JUDGMENT ORDER - July 31, 1989, Filed
In accordance with the Opinion and Order filed on this date, judgment is entered in favor of the defendant.