The opinion of the court was delivered by: REVERCOMB
GEORGE H. REVERCOMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiffs Computer Security International, Inc. (CSI) and Alan F. Gersman claim that the Defendant Group Health Association, Inc. violated the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C. Code 1-2501 et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by terminating a contract with Plaintiff CSI solely because Plaintiff Gersman, the president and principal stockholder of Plaintiff CSI, is Jewish. This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim and because neither Plaintiff has standing to bring this action. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).
For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss this Court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the Plaintiffs' complaint as true. Stewart v. District of Columbia Armory Bd., 274 U.S. App. D.C. 324, 863 F.2d 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir. 1988). Plaintiff CSI and Defendant entered into a contract with each other in August 1983 whereby Plaintiff CSI agreed to store Defendant's computer software generated in the course of its business. The contract provided for a one-year term with automatic renewal for successive one-month periods until either Party provided thirty-days notice of termination.
The contract further provided that "for renewal terms, notice of adjustment in the fixed charges shall be supplied in writing not less than forty-five (45) days prior to the renewal date at which the charges will take effect." The agreement remained in effect between the Parties as they had originally contemplated until Defendant terminated it in November 1987.
In the latter part of 1986 Mr. Mohammad Ghafori became the operations manager of Defendant's Management Operations System. In August 1987, Mr. Adel Nakhla, an assistant to Mr. Ghafori, met with Plaintiff Gersman and asked him, under the direction of Mr. Ghafori, if Plaintiff Gersman were Jewish to which he answered yes. Prior to the above incident Defendant had consistently expressed its satisfaction with Plaintiff CSI's services but after the incident Plaintiff Gersman began hearing rumors that Defendant was dissatisfied. Plaintiff Gersman approached the highest level managers of Defendant who, while admitting that the inquiry about Plaintiff Gersman's heritage had occurred, did not take measures to rectify the situation. On October 6th, 1987, one of Defendant's employees, under the direction of Mr. Ghafori, refused to renew Defendant's contract with Plaintiff CSI.
In Patterson, an employee alleged that her employer had harassed and failed to promote her on the basis of race in abridgment of her right to make and enforce contracts. The Court held that the employee did not have a cause of action on the basis of the alleged harassment under § 1981 because the contracts clause applied only to the formation of contracts and the enforcement of contracts through the legal process. The employer's alleged harassment constituted "postformation conduct . . . relating to the terms and conditions of continuing employment," id. 109 S. Ct. at 2374, which was not within the scope of § 1981:
The right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions. Such postformation conduct does not involve the right to make a contract, but rather implicates the performance of established contract obligations and the conditions of continuing employment . . . .
In regard to the employer's alleged failure to promote the employee on the ground of race the Court recognized that in some instances an employer's failure to promote an employee could constitute a refusal to enter into a new contract but cautioned that "only where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer is such a claim actionable under § 1981." Id. at 2377.
In the instant case, the Defendant argues that it simply terminated an existing contract with Plaintiff CSI and that its action accordingly constitutes postformation conduct not within the scope of § 1981. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the original contract terminated on its own terms after one year and that the Parties subsequently entered into a series of new contracts for one-month terms. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs characterize the Defendant's failure to renew the contract not as a termination of an existing contract but as a refusal to enter into a new contract.
The provision that the contract would be automatically renewed at the end of one year for successive one-month periods unless either Party affirmatively terminated the contract was a result of the negotiations of the Parties in the first instance. It is illogical to argue that when the automatic renewal provision took effect within the original contemplation of the Parties new and distinct contracts were created. These automatic renewals occurred precisely because they were provided for in the contract formed in 1983. The decision of the Defendant to ...